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1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
One of the most significant political and societal transformations was set in motion in 
this country‟s history by the first democratic general elections in South Africa in 
1994.1  A decade later the process of political and social transformation continues.2  
A key factor for this rather slow speed of transformation in society is the fact that 
“most people were not psychologically prepared for the type or level of change 
required of them”.3  Deep-seated values and believes, previously upheld by the 
political dispensation, would only have change over some time.  Societal 
transformation depends on the commitment of people to the appreciation of human 
dignity of all, as opposed to the acceptance of racial segregation and biases, 
however the process of affirmative action and societal transformation does not satisfy 
everyone because some people in society feel that they are completely 
disadvantaged by this process.4   
 
In South African law, affirmative action has been a very controversial topic over the 
years.5  Controversial issues such as perceptions and reactions of affirmative action 
in the South African context are varied.6  These reactions are often categorised as 
politically explosive and emotionally charged.7  Most people fear the implications of 
affirmative action, more specifically the impact thereof on their individual positions 
within the workplace.8  Those who feel threatened by these measures, tend to 
question the political and ethical legitimacy thereof.9  Those who stand to benefit from 
                                               
1
  Leonard Communicating Affirmative Action during Transformational Change: A South African 
Case Study Perspective (2005) LLM thesis University of Pretoria 1. 
2
  Ibid. 
3
  Ibid. 
4
  Ibid. 
5
  Ibid. 
6
  Ibid. 
7
  Ibid. 
8
  Ibid. 
9
  Ibid. 
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these measures often dislike the labelling associated with these measures.10  
Confusion also exits in greater society about relationship between the equal 
opportunity, black advancement, affirmative action and diversity management 
paradigms and related practices.  The sources of conflicting reactions to affirmative 
action stem from individual, group and cultural believes and values which were both 
shaped by the political realities of the previous regime and the ideals people cherish 
for themselves in the current dispensation.  Colonialist and apartheid laws, policies 
and practices which were racist and patriarchal provided for separate societies for 
blacks, whites, Indians and coloureds.11  At this point in time separate labour systems 
with job reservation were applicable for whites.  There were also wage 
differentiations between white and black people and between sexes.12  Furthermore, 
disabled people were kept dependant and there were also discriminatory legislative 
provisions against them.13  This history of systemic discrimination and its resulting 
inequality and entrenched disadvantage for black, coloured and Indian women and 
the disabled, was and still is well-known both nationally and internationally.14 
 
Internationally, apartheid has been extensively disapproved.  Examples hereof 
include the United Nations that declared apartheid and its impact a “crime against 
humanity” and a negation of the United Nations Charter,15 expressions of censure 
culminated in the adoption of the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crimes of Apartheid16 and the expulsion of South Africa from the 
United Nations and its agencies.17 
 
Nationally, on the other hand, South Africa promulgated several legislative pieces 
namely, the Constitution, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.  In terms of 
                                               
10
  Ibid. 
11
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” (2011) De Jure 113. 
12
  Ibid. 
13
  Ibid. 
14
  Ibid. 
15
  Signed on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945. 
16
  Entered into force on 18 July 1976. 
17
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 113. 
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the Constitution a notion of substantive equality was incorporated in the Bill of Rights.  
Section 9 of the Constitution specifically provides that no person may be 
discriminated against and provides a list of grounds which are specifically prohibited.  
The Constitution furthermore affirms the values of equality, dignity and freedom.  The 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 aims at 
eliminating social and economic inequalities which were generated by apartheid.  
The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 is similar to the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act and recognises the inequalities in 
employment, occupation and income which exist as a result of apartheid. 
 
Furthermore, there were two landmark cases that discussed instances where an 
employer gives effect of affirmative action, where designated groups do not get a 
post even though they were properly trained and most suitably qualified.  These were 
Harmse v City of Cape Town18 and Dudley v City of Cape Town.19  In the Dudley 
case the court has the opportunity to consider the relationship between the right not 
to be unfairly discriminated against and the obligation to implement affirmative action.  
In the Harmse case the court provided some insight into what allegations should be 
brought by an applicant to support a discrimination claim.   
 
Affirmative action has a tendency to evoke much emotion and spark a heated debate 
amongst all South Africans.20  Yet a few can deny the need for measures of some 
sort to address the racial inequality in the labour market experienced during the 
apartheid years.21   
 
With reference to the above, I will outline my chapters in the thesis as will follow.  In 
Chapter 1, I will firstly give a brief introduction to the treatise and the issues that I will 
be addressing in this thesis will be discussed.   
 
                                               
18
   [2003] 6 BLLR 557 (LC). 
19
  (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC). 
20
  Coetzer “Affirmative Action: The Sword versus Shield Debate Continues” (2009) 21 SA Merc LJ 
92;  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative 
Action in South African Workplaces” 113. 
21
  Coetzer “Affirmative Action: The Sword versus Shield Debate Continues” 92. 
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In Chapter 2, a broad overview of why affirmative action was necessary in South 
Africa as a tool for social change will be embarked on.22  An outline of the landscape 
of South Africa‟s jurisprudence on affirmative action, touching on relevant legislation, 
namely the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 
2000 and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.  However, the discussion will be 
limited to whether affirmative action is a right in the hands of the scorned employee 
or a defence to be raised by the employer against that employee, with reference to 
case law.23   
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I will attempt to show how the labour courts have all answered 
this question unanimously in recent cases, in response to the landmark decisions of 
firstly, Harmse v City of Cape Town24 and secondly, Dudley v City of Cape Town25 
respectively. 
 
Chapter 5 will be a discussion on when affirmative action results in unfair 
discrimination.  In this regard I will discuss affirmative action as a defence and when 
an employee argues that he should be promoted because the employer was required 
to implement affirmative action measures.   
 
In Chapter 6 I will discuss the role of the Department of Labour with regard to the 
enforcement of the Employment Equity Act.   
 
Chapter 7 will embark on a discussion with regard to the failure to employ or promote 
a person who does not fall outside the category of designated groups.  Chapter 8 will 
discuss the dismissals of employees to make room for affirmative action 
appointments. 
 
Lastly, in chapter 8 I will conclude. 
                                               
22
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 113. 
23
  Ibid. 
24
  [2003] 6 BLLR 557(LC). 
25
  (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTION AND NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the impact of the Constitution will be discussed.  Furthermore, the 
impact of national legislation, more specifically, the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act and the Employment Equity Act will be 
discussed. 
 
2.2 THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Only after several years of both international and national pressure, was a 
democratic constitutional order adopted, under which a commitment was made in 
achieving the objective of equality.26  A notion of substantive equality is contained in 
the new Constitution27 in the Bill of Rights.  The new Constitution is forming the basis 
of the legal system of South Africa.28  This notion mentioned above recognises that 
opportunities are determined by individuals‟ social and historical status, including 
race and gender, as part of a group or groups.29  The notion furthermore 
acknowledges that discriminatory acts do not occur in isolation and form part of 
patterns of behaviour towards groups, such as women, disabled people and blacks 
which results in “disadvantage” for such groups.30  The nature of such disadvantage 
                                               
26
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 113. 
27
  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
28
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 113. 
29
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 113-114. 
30
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 114. 
6 
may be social, economic, political and educational nature.31  Affirmative action 
measures are needed to achieve true equality due to the fact that the prohibition of 
unfair discrimination is insufficient to achieve it.32  These measures distribute social 
goods in a group-based way on the basis of, for example, race and sex, and seek to 
correct imbalances where factual inequalities and disadvantages exist.33  Affirmative 
action is merely a temporary means to promote equality.34 
 
The Constitution further provides to establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and human rights.35  The founding values of the country are the 
achievement of equality, non-racism and non-sexism.36  The Bill of Rights affirms the 
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.37  Equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.38  The Constitution attempts to promote the 
achievement of equality.  In this context, the Constitution provides a non-exhaustive 
list of grounds which prohibits unfair discrimination.  Provisions are furthermore made 
for affirmative action through “legislative and other measures, designed to protect or 
advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination”.39 
 
Affirmative action is authorised by the Constitution in a broad manner.40  Persons or 
category of persons “disadvantaged by unfair discrimination” are the beneficiaries of 
affirmative action measures.41  The Constitution does not however elaborate on 
either the cause or the effect of unfair discrimination and the cause of the 
disadvantage of unfair discrimination is clear.42  In essence, the Constitution does not 
                                               
31
  Ibid. 
32
  Ibid. 
33
  Ibid. 
34
  Ibid. 
35
  Ibid. 
36
  Ibid. 
37
  Ibid. 
38
  Ibid. 
39
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 114-115. 
40
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 115. 
41
  Ibid. 
42
  Ibid. 
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offer a clearly articulated statement recognising the nature of disadvantage that 
needs to be remedied, neither does it specify the nature of the unfair discrimination 
(the grounds on which it has occurred) which have caused such disadvantage.43  
Moreover, the Constitution is silent on proving disadvantage and or its cause or 
causes.44 
 
As seen from the discussion above it is clear that the Constitution has several flaws 
in terms of affirmative action which needs improvement. 
 
2.3 NATIONAL LEGISLATION (ORDINARY LEGISLATION) 
SUPPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Ordinary legislation, such as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act”) and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 
1998 (hereinafter referred to as the “Employment Equity Act”) came into effect 
respectively.  Both of these acts are associated with the socio-economic 
transformation of the country and further these acts expand the basic constitutional 
framework.45  The nature of the injustices and divisions of the past are clarified in 
these two acts. These acts further clarify the terms “disadvantage” and “unfair 
discrimination”, as found in the Preamble and in section 9(2) of the Constitution 
respectively.46  These two acts will be discussed below.47 
 
2.3.1 PROMOTION OF EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR 
DISCRIMINATION ACT 
 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, in a detailed 
manner, recognises the pain and suffering of the great majority of South African 
people.  The Act further attempts to eliminate social and economic inequalities which 
                                               
43
  Ibid. 
44
  S 9(5) of the Constitution, 1996. 
45
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 115. 
46
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 115-116. 
47
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 116. 
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were generated by colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy.48  The main aim of the act 
is to promote de jure and de facto equality and equality in terms of outcomes.49  It 
particularly mentions the advancement of: 
 
“Historically disadvantaged individuals, communities and social groups who were 
dispossessed of their land and resources, deprived of their human dignity and who 
continue to endure such consequences”.
50 
 
In essence, its reach goes wider than that of historically disadvantaged people in the 
sense that it targets people disadvantaged by both past and present unfair 
discrimination.51  The Act further places a duty and a responsibility on the state, 
institutions performing public functions and all people to promote equality in respect 
of race, gender and disability.52   
 
Unlike the Constitution, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act names the injustices and divisions of the past namely the unfairly 
discriminatory systems of colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy and the 
discriminatory grounds on which these systems were practised.53  It clearly indicated 
the wide range of the disadvantage these systems have caused in respect of race, 
gender and disability, as extending to all spheres of life.54  However, the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act is similar to the Constitution in 
the sense that the act is silent on proving “disadvantage,” a test for “disadvantage” or 
its causes, in the context of affirmative action.55 
                                               
48
  Preamble of Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.  The Promotion 
of Equality and Prevention of Unfair discrimination Act does not apply to any person to whom 
and to the extent to which Employment Equity Act applies. This is set out in s 5(3); McGregor 
“Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action in South 
African Workplaces” 115. 
49
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 115. 
50
  Preamble of Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act; McGregor 
“Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action in South 
African Workplaces” 116. 
51
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 116. 
52
  Ibid. 
53
  Ibid. 
54
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 116-117. 
55
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 117. 
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2.3.2 EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT  
 
The Employment Equity Act, similar to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act, recognises in a fairly detailed manner that “as a result of 
apartheid and other discriminatory laws and practices”, these are disparities in 
employment, occupation and income within the labour market.56  These disparities, 
created certain disadvantages for black people, women, and people with disabilities. 
These are the beneficiaries of affirmative action under the Employment Equity Act.57  
In 2007, South African people of Chinese descent have been declared to fall within 
the ambit of the definition of “black people” for purposes of the Act.58  Once more, to 
recognise unfair discrimination and its resultant disadvantage in legislation is 
important as legislation is generally viewed as an expression of the will of people.59  
The Act thus clearly articulates that the discriminatory systems of apartheid basically 
caused economic disadvantage to blacks, women and the disabled in the 
workplace.60 
 
Similar to the Constitution, the Employment Equity Act is silent on proving 
“disadvantage”, a test for “disadvantage” or its causes, in the context of affirmative 
action.61  However, the Act recognises and articulates in detail, the past system of 
apartheid to have unfairly discriminated against people on the basis of race, sex and 
disability.62 The Act also clearly articulates the resulting disadvantage of these 
systems on groups possessing these characteristics.63 
 
Section 2 sets out the main purpose of the Act.  The purpose of this Act is:  
 
                                               
56
  Ibid. 
57
  Ibid. 
58
  Ibid. 
59
  McGregor “Judicial Notice: Discrimination and Disadvantage in the Context of Affirmative Action 
in South African Workplaces” 118. 
60
  Ibid. 
61
  Ibid. 
62
  Ibid. 
63
  Ibid. 
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“to achieve equity in the workplace by implementing affirmative action measures to 
redress the disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups in order 
to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels in 
the workforce”.64 
 
Section 3 of the Act must be interpreted in compliance with the Constitution to give 
effect to its purpose.65  The purpose of affirmative action in a positive sense has been 
described as being “designed to eliminate inequality and address systemic and 
institutionalised discrimination including racial and gender discrimination”.66  
Furthermore, section 9(2) of the Constitution is concerned with the achievement of 
substantive equality as opposed to formal equality.67  Formal equality holds that the 
law is neutral, where the state is a neutral force between citizens and favours no one 
above the other.68  Substantive equality on the other hand is fundamentally different, 
taking cognisance of structural inequality in society in relation to certain groups and 
attempting to remedy this inequality. 
  
“The premium placed on the achievement of equality is evident where this idea l is 
identified as a value on which the democratic South African state is founded (in terms 
of section 1(a) of the Constitution). In other words, not mere formal equality but 
substantive equality is the constitutional goal in the sense of outcome of results and not 
merely equality of treatment… In this regard section 9(2) of the Constitution also 
specifically endorses the use of affirmative action in that „to promote the achievement 
of equality‟, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”
69 
 
The Constitution provides in section 9(2) for the institution of measures to address 
previous inequality.  The Employment Equity Act thus gives effect to the Constitution 
by seeking to implement affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantage 
experienced in employment by designated groups.  “Designated groups” is a term 
encompassing black people, women and the disabled.  Moreover, “black people” is a 
broad term and includes Africans, Coloureds and Indians.  These groups namely, 
                                               
64
  S 2 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998; Public Servants Association on behalf of Karriem 
v SA Police Service ZALC 23-02-2006 Case No 435/2004. 
65
  Coetzer “Affirmative Action: The Sword versus Shield Debate Continues” 92 93. 
66
  Coetzer “Affirmative Action: The Sword versus Shield Debate Continues” 93. 
67
  Ibid. 
68
  Ibid. 
69
  Ntai & Others v SA Breweries Ltd (2001) 22 ILJ 214 (LC) para 14. 
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black people, women and the disabled, has been identified as beneficiaries of 
affirmative action measures, and so the employment of people from these designated 
groups seeks to achieve employment equity.70  The Act goes a step further and 
provides for a “designated employer”.  The phrase “designated employer” is defined 
as meaning firstly, a person who employs 50 (fifty) or more employees, secondly a 
person who employs less than 50 (fifty) employees but has a turnover greater than or 
equal to an amount stipulated, thirdly a municipality, fourthly an organ of state 
(except the local spheres of government, the South African National Defence Force, 
the National intelligence Agency, and the South African Secret Service), and lastly an 
employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 or 31 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995, which appoints it as a designated employer in terms of the 
Employment Equity Act.71 
 
In addition, a member of a designated group may be suitably qualified, provided that 
one or any combination of the following points is considered namely formal 
qualifications, prior learning, relevant experience, and capacity to acquire, within a 
reasonable time, the ability to do the job.72  
 
The Labour Court had to consider the nature of affirmative action for the first time in 
the case of Harmse v City of Cape Town.73  The applicant in this case was a black 
person according to the Employment Equity Act.  He had applied for various posts 
with the employer but has not been shortlisted for any of the posts.  He then sued the 
respondent, stating that he had been unfairly discriminated against because of race 
and lack of relevant experience.  Waglay J reached the rather strained conclusion 
that affirmative action was a right in the hands of an employee from a designated 
group: 
 
“if one were to have regard only to section 6 of the Act then one might be drawn to the 
conclusion that affirmative action is no more than a defence to a claim of unfair 
discrimination.  Affirmative action is indeed a defence to be deployed by an employer 
against claims that it has discriminated unfairly against an employee.  In this sense, it 
                                               
70
  Coetzer “Affirmative Action: The Sword versus Shield Debate Continues” 95. 
71
  Ibid. 
72
  S 20(3) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998; Coetzer “Affirmative Action: The Sword 
versus Shield Debate Continues” 95. 
73
  [2003] 6 BLLR 557 (LC). 
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serves as a shield.  However, having regard to the fact that the Act requires an 
employer to take measures to eliminate discrimination in the workplace it also serves 
as a sword.”
74 
 
Although the court made a fist on embracing substantive equality, it failed to maintain 
the distinction between chapter II of the Employment Equity Act, which deals with the 
prohibition of unfair discrimination, and chapter III, which deals with affirmative 
action, where it is argued that if South Africa is serious about substantive equality, it 
follows that the notion of unfair discrimination should be expanded to include 
infringements of substantive equality by an employer.   
 
In my view of the above, the Employment Equity Act recognises in a fairly detailed 
manner that because of the discriminatory laws, practices and as a result of 
apartheid there are disparities in employment, occupation and income within the 
Labour market.  The result of these disparities is that it created certain disadvantages 
for black people, women and people with disabilities.  However, it is not always 
possible to give effect to the aim of the act.  In essence, the act does attempt to 
address the injustices of the past.  The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act on the other hand is a dynamic piece of legislation because 
it mentions and names the division and injustices of the past such as unfairly 
discriminatory systems of colonialism, apartheid and patriarchy and discrimination 
grounds on which these systems were practised.  However, a most fundamental flaw 
recognised is the fact that neither of these acts has expanded on the requirements of 
proving disadvantage and its causes. 
                                               
74
  Harmse v City of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 (LC) para 44. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF HARMSE v CITY OF CAPE TOWN (2003) 24 ILJ 
1130 (LC) ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE RIGHT OF JOB 
CANDIDATES 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Applicants face significant hurdles in successfully pursuing a claim underlying the 
procedure of unfair discrimination.75  The court however provides some insight into 
what essential allegations should be made by an applicant to support a discrimination 
claim.76  This insight is provided in the case of Harmse v City of Cape Town.77  The 
judge‟s remarks relating to the absence of a difference between direct and indirect 
discrimination claims are of particular importance in the above mentioned case and 
will be discussed below.78  However, before embarking on the judges remarks the 
background of the decision needs to be discussed. 
 
3.2 BACKGROUND TO THE DECISION 
 
Mr Harmse, a “black person” applied for three posts at the City of Cape Town.  He 
was not shortlisted for any one of the posts in question.79  As a result, Harmse 
approached the Labour Court, alleging unfair discrimination against him on the basis 
of race, political belief and „lack of relevant experience‟.80  In support of his action 
against the employer, and as required by Rule 6 of the Labour Court Rules, Harmse 
filed a statement of claim setting out what purported to be a clear and concise 
                                               
75
  Garbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?” Vol 
12 No 10 (May 2003) Contemporary  Labour Law 91. 
76
  Garbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?” 92. 
77
  Garbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?” 91-
92. 
78
  Garbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?” 92. 
79
  Garbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?” 92; 
Harmse v City of Cape Town [2003] 6 BLLR 557 (LC) 558. 
80
  Ibid. 
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statement of the material facts and legal issues relating to his claim.81  The employer 
reacted to this by raising exception proceedings against the statement of claim on 
two legal grounds, namely that the claim did not disclose a cause of action and that it 
was “vague and embarrassing”.82 
 
For present purposes, the exception that the statement of claim did not disclose a 
cause of action, raised in respect of all the grounds of discrimination relied upon by 
the applicant, is particularly important with regard to the alleged discrimination on the 
basis of “lack of relevant experience”.83  Whereas the employer‟s objection to the 
claim based on alleged discrimination on the basis of race and political belief related 
not to the existence of such a claim in law, but rather how it was pleaded, the 
employer‟s exception to the “lack of relevant experience” claim prompted the court to 
consider the existence of such a claim in law and to enter the realm of affirmative 
action.84 
 
The employer also argued that, as a matter of law, applicants in discrimination claims 
have to specifically mention whether their claims are based on direct or indirect 
discrimination.85  Failure to do this, according to the employer, means that a case of 
unfair discrimination is not sufficiently pleaded.86 
 
3.3 THE REASONING OF THE JUDGE IN RELATION TO AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION 
 
In dismissing the employer‟s argument, the court accepted the following seven (7) 
propositions.  Firstly, subsections 20(3)-(5) of the Employment Equity Act, which 
introduce, define and regulate the concept of “suitably qualified”, even though located 
in chapter III of the Employment Equity Act, applied to all employers.   Section 20(3) 
contains the definition of “suitably qualified”, section 20(4) places an obligation on 
                                               
81
  Ibid. 
82
  Garbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?” 92; 
Harmse v City of Cape Town 557. 
83
  Garbers “The Right of a Job Candidate to Affirmative Action Selection: A Landmark Case?” 92; 
Harmse v City of Cape Town 558. 
84
  Ibid. 
85
  Ibid. 
86
  Ibid. 
15 
employers to take all the factors mentioned in the definition of “suitably qualified” into 
consideration in determining the suitability of a member of a designated group, while 
section 20(5) prohibits unfair discrimination solely on the basis of lack of relevant 
experience.87   
 
Secondly, section 5 of the Employment Equity Act, although located in chapter II of 
the Employment Equity Act, places a duty on all employers to implement affirmative 
action.88   
 
Thirdly, the decision whether a member of a designated group is “suitably qualified” 
is an “employment policy or practice” as defined in section 1 of the Employment 
Equity Act and as used in section 6 of the Employment Equity Act, which contains the 
basic prohibition on unfair discrimination.89  As such, the determination whether a 
person is suitably qualified falls under one of the requirements for a claim of unfair 
discrimination laid down in section 6 of the Employment Equity Act.90   
 
Fourthly, sections 20(3)-(5) of the Employment Equity Act can be linked to both the 
purpose of the EEA as set out in section 2(a) of the Act, as well as to the purpose of 
section 5 of the Act, which is the “promotion of equal opportunity through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination”.91 
 
Fifthly, the list of grounds on which discrimination may take place is not exhaustive 
and therefore can include “lack of relevant experience”.92  As such, unfair 
discrimination on the basis of lack of experience may possibly be pursued under 
section 20(5) of the Act or under section 6 of the Act.93   
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Sixthly, the Constitution, in section 9, embraces a substantive notion of equality and 
there is a duty on the courts to fully develop the notion of substantive equality.94  
 
Seventhly, “affirmative action”, in the constitutional sense of measures to protect or 
advance person or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, is 
part and parcel of the constitutional right to equality.95  
 
Lastly, affirmative action cannot be “a shield” for employers.96  This would mean that 
the “weak” (the employee) is left without a remedy should employers failed to 
promote substantive equality.97 
 
A combination of the above led the Court to conclude that if an employer fails to 
promote the achievement of equality through taking affirmative action measures, then 
it may properly be said that the employer has violated the right of an employee who 
falls within one of the designated groups not to be unfairly discriminated against.98 
Similarly, if an employer discriminates against an employee in the non-designated 
group by preferring an employee from the designated group who is not “suitably 
qualified”… then the employer has violated the right of such an employee not to be 
discriminated against unfairly.99  In either case, the issue is whether the employer 
has violated the right of such an employee not to be discriminated against unfairly.100  
To this extent, affirmative action can found a basis for a cause of action.101  On an 
analysis of the Constitution and the Employment Equity Act, I am satisfied that the 
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Act indeed provide a right to affirmative action.102  The exact scope and boundaries 
of such a right is a matter that has to be developed out of the facts of each case.103 
 
3.4 EVALUATION 
 
Both conceptually and practically the conclusion of the Harmse case has far-reaching 
and important implications.104  In this regard the judgment is of crucial importance 
and should be taken seriously and calls for close scrutiny.105 
 
The Constitution does not use the word “affirmative action”, nor does it give any 
indication what exactly these measures to redress unfair discrimination, or who 
exactly the beneficiaries of these measures, should be.106  As borne out by the 
Courts, the only requirement implicit in the Constitution is that these measures, such 
as they are, must be rational they are two different things and that, in the final 
analysis, they should be kept distinct.107  The counter- argument to this, and this 
seems to be implicit in the Harmse decision reasoning, is that a broad notion of 
equality (which we get from the Constitution) simply implies that the phrase “the 
elimination of unfair discrimination” (used in section 2(a) and 5 of the Act) includes 
affirmative action.108 
 
As mentioned above, this argument is not constitutionally clear cut and, as I have just 
tried to show, simply ignores the structure and wording of the Employment Equity 
Act.109  Both the Constitution and section 2 of the Employment Equity Act are, of 
course, the primary determinants in the interpretation of the Employment Equity Act 
(according to section 3 of the Act).110  If section 2 of the Act expressly follows the 
wording of the Constitution (in section 2(b)) and section 3 tells us how important the 
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Constitution and section 2 are in understanding the Act, why ignore half of section 
2?111 
 
3.5 THE LINK BETWEEN CHAPTERS II AND III OF THE EMPLOYMENT 
EQUITY ACT 
 
The main thrust of the reasoning in the Harmse case was based on interpretation of 
the Employment Equity Act and concerned the existence of a link between Chapter II 
of the Act, which is headed “Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination”, and Chapter III of 
the Act, which is headed “Affirmative Action”.112  The establishment of such a link is, 
of course, necessary if one wants to recognise that there rests a duty on all 
employers to implement affirmative action, that all members of designated groups 
have a right to affirmative action and that the absence of affirmative action can 
constitute unfair discrimination (again, by all employers).113   In short, the court found 
the link primarily in section 5 of the Act (section 5 falls in Chapter II of the Act).114  
The court read a duty on all employers to implement affirmative action into that 
section and, consequently, held that the absence of affirmative action may found a 
claim of unfair discrimination against any employer.115 
 
What these findings require is a careful scrutiny of the relationship between Chapters 
II and III of the Employment Equity Act.  As point of departure, one has to emphasise 
that the Employment Equity Act deals with apparently different things – the 
“prohibition of unfair discrimination” and “affirmative action” – in different chapters of 
the Act (Chapters II and III respectively).  This already adds further weight to the 
remarks made earlier about section 2 of the Act (which sets out the Act‟s purpose). 
We also know from the Constitutional Court judgment on the interpretation of section 
197 of the LRA116 that the location of a section in a particular chapter in an Act could 
be important in giving meaning to that section.  At first glance then, the prohibition of 
unfair discrimination and the implementation of affirmative action should be kept 
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distinct and section 5 has nothing to do with affirmative action.  What confuses 
matters, however, is that the Employment Equity Act itself contains a number of 
sections which clearly, or may conceivably; provide a link between Chapters II and III 
of the Employment Equity Act.   
 
3.6 THE MEANING OF THE JUDGMENT  
 
The discussion has hopefully illustrated that there exist fundamental problems with 
the reasoning of Waglay J relating to affirmative action as measured against the 
nature of discrimination law, the different notions of equality, the provisions of the 
Constitution and the provisions of the Employment Equity Act itself.117  In short, the 
judgement ignores the deliberate use in the Act of words laden with meaning in the 
discrimination context (the different notion of equality), overstates the role of 
affirmative action in Constitutional terms and provides too superficial an analysis of 
the structure and content of the Employment Equity Act itself.118 
 
This simply means that no general duty to implement affirmative action or an 
individual right to affirmative action, can be read into the Employment Equity Act.119  
Neither can the absence of affirmative action be, in itself, a cause of action for an 
unfair discrimination claim.120  The extension of Chapter III of the Act to employers 
currently not designated would require legislative amendment.121 
 
This may be the result of political momentum or of a finding that the Employment 
Equity Act is unconstitutional as it unduly infringes on the right to substantive equality 
laid down in section 9 of the Constitution.122  This, in turn, would depend on a finding 
that the Constitutional equality provision places a duty on, amongst other, all 
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employers to implement affirmative action.123  This, as already indicated above, is 
hardly clear-cut.124 
 
For the reason explained, I do not agree with the finding of the court in the Harmse 
case.  There are simply too many questions and reservations.125  It is valuable 
because it takes substantive equality seriously and, consequently, challenges our 
understanding of discrimination, the Employment Equity Act, and the position of 
members of designated groups who continue to be excluded from the workplace.126  
 
The court justified this reasoning by stating that if affirmative action were not a right, it 
would leave employees who were unfairly discriminated against without a remedy if 
the employer failed to promote substantive equality in the workplace.127  Yet the court 
did not take into account that such employees could still rely on section 9(3) and 
23(1) of the Constitution, as well as other statutory provisions such as section 6(1) of 
the Employment Equity Act and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act in order to institute action.128  In fact, if Harmse had merely 
reformulated his pleadings, he could easily have brought his action in terms of 
chapter II of the Employment Equity Act.129 
 
Secondly, from a more practical standpoint, conferring a right to affirmative action 
upon individuals would lead to absurd results.130  For instance, what would happen if 
an employer had already met, or had even exceeded, the required level of 
representivity of all designated groups, but then failed to employ a person from a 
designated group?  In terms of a strict interpretation of Harmse v City of Cape Town, 
that employer could be held liable for his failure to promote affirmative action.131  A 
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right to affirmative action, I submit, would give rise to frivolous lawsuits and vexatious 
litigation.132 
 
It is clear from the discussion above that the merits of the Harmse case forced us to 
consider the relationship between unfair discrimination and affirmative action, against 
the background of the Constitution commitment to substantive equality.  In this case 
the court found that the Employment Equity Act itself does in effect, create a right to 
affirmative action but left open the question whether the position would be the same 
in terms of an employers‟ employment equity plan designated in terms of the 
employment Equity Act.  In the Harmse case the court held that if we are serious 
about substantive equality, if it was not legitimate to ask whether affirmative action is 
a pre-requisite for the elimination of discrimination? The answer was, however 
suggested to remain no, because it confuses measures and values.  The point at 
stake is neither elimination of unfair discrimination nor of affirmative action.  The 
value that‟s at stake is equality.  Both the prohibition of unfair discrimination and the 
obligation to implement affirmative action are mere tools or mechanisms to attain or 
to reach equality. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF DUDLEY v CITY OF CAPE TOWN AND 
ANOTHER (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC) ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND 
THE RIGHT TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS APPOINTMENTS 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Labour Court had an opportunity to consider the relationship between the right 
not to be unfairly discriminated against and the obligation to implement affirmative 
action in the case of Dudley v City of Cape Town & another.133  In this case the court 
held that unfair discrimination and affirmative action should be kept separate and that 
a failure to implement affirmative action cannot be a cause for an individual to claim a 
right to such action, neither as such, nor under the guise of unfair discrimination.  A 
discussion on the background of the case, the respondent‟s exception, whether the 
decision of the Harmse case is wrong and the conflict between the 2 cases will be 
discussed below. 
 
4.2 THE BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF THE DUDLEY CASE  
 
Mrs Dudley, the applicant in this case had been in the employment of the Cape Town 
Municipality since 1998.  In 1998 she was appointed to the position of specialist: 
health service support and in 1999 seconded to the position acting head: municipal 
health services.134   She was appointed in February 2001 as Interim Manager of 
Health Services in the City of Cape Town after the merging of different 
municipalities.135  She was part of the Cities interim executive team, which consisted 
of 16 people. She was the only woman and one of only four black people on the 
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executive team.  In November 2001 the City advertised the position of Director for 
City Health.136  The applicant applied for the post but was unsuccessful and a white 
male was appointed to the post.    
 
The abovementioned took place despite the following.  Firstly, that the applicant had 
illustrated her competency for the job during the panel interview and secondly the 
City‟s obligation to implement and commitment to affirmative action.137  In this regard 
the policy of the employer stated that the central guiding principle for selection shall 
be competence in relation to the inherent requirements of the job provided that 
selection shall favour, as determined by the targets, suitably qualified applicants as 
defined in section 20(3) of the Employment Equity Act.138  Lastly, that the highest 
level of management of the employer was that all ten (10) employees were male and 
eight (8) thereof was white.139  At the second level of management, where the job in 
issue was located, 51 (fifty one) employees were employed of whom 42 (forty two) 
were male, 26 (twenty six) white and only four (4) black women.140 
 
4.3 THE APPLICANT’S CASE 
 
Unfair discrimination was the essence of the employee‟s case against the 
employer.141  Two aspects of arguments were used by the applicant to demonstrate 
that the employer did in fact unfairly discriminate against her.142  In her first argument 
she straightforwardly blamed the employer of unfairly discriminating against her 
because of her sex and race.143  In this regard, the employee‟s case relied on the 
factual allegations that she was the best candidate for the position and that she 
would have been appointed but was not appointed due to the fact that she was a 
black woman.144  As such, this part of the employee‟s case containing nothing new or 
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surprising it is regarded as a straightforward allegation of unfair discrimination that 
fits nicely under section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act.145 
 
The second argument made matters complicated by the fact that the employee also 
chose to link her non-appointment to the alleged breach by the employer of its 
affirmative action obligations in terms of the Employment Equity Act as well as the 
employer‟s own affirmative action policy.  This, according to the employee, entitled 
her to relief for two reasons.  Firstly, these breaches in themselves, entitle her to ask 
the court for relief to enforce the employer‟s affirmative action obligations.  Secondly, 
she alleged that the failure to implement affirmative action constituted unfair 
discrimination against her on the basis of race and gender. 
 
4.4 THE RESPONDENT’S EXCEPTIONS 
 
The employer raised a number of exceptions to the allegations made by the 
applicant.146  The employer furthermore denied that these allegations as a matter of 
law entitled the applicant to possible relief and raised three (3) arguments against the 
allegations made.147 
 
Firstly, the employer based his argument on the fact that a failure to implement 
affirmative action by, for example, failing to appoint a member of a designated group, 
cannot in law amount to unfair discrimination and secondly that the Labour Court has 
no jurisdiction in this matter.148  In the first instance to entertain a claim based on an 
alleged breach of an employer‟s affirmative action obligations.149 In this regard, the 
basis of the employer‟s argument was that the Employment Equity Act makes it clear 
that the primary means of enforcement of affirmative action is through monitoring and 
administrative compliance procedures.150  Simply put, an employee who is aggrieved 
by an employer‟s non-compliance with its affirmative action obligations cannot, as a 
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first port of call, approach the Labour Court for relief.151  Lastly, the employer also 
argued that the employee‟s own statement that she should have been appointed as 
she was the best candidate contradicted the allegation that she should have been 
preferred for appointment as an affirmative action candidate.152  The employer 
argued, the applicant‟s statement of claim was vague and embarrassing and did not 
put the employer in a position to answer the case.153  After all, on her own version, if 
she indeed had been the best candidate, there would have been no need for 
affirmative action on the basis that she is black and/or a woman.154 
 
The court had little hesitation in accepting the exception mentioned in the last 
argument above, a finding that serves more as a lesson in the precise drafting of a 
statement of claim than any fundamental lesson in law.155 
 
Of particular importance is the part of the judgment, which revolves around the 
exceptions mentioned in the first two points above.156   But before considering the 
reasoning of the court, it is important to deviate and consider the nature of the 
exception proceedings based on the argument that an applicant‟s allegation does not 
disclose a cause of action.157   Exception proceedings and especially exceptions 
such as those mentioned in these above, mean in effect, that a court does not 
consider the merits or facts of a case.158  The court is called on to decide whether an 
applicant should as a matter of law be allowed to proceed any further with his/her 
case.159 
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4.5 THE DECISION IN THE HARMSE CASE IS REGARDED AS WRONG 
 
Faced with reliance by the applicant on the judgment in Harmse, the court made 
short thrift of the reasoning in that case.160  In Harmse, one of the key considerations 
in equating an absence of affirmative action with unfair discrimination was the view 
that section 20(3) – (5) of the Employment Equity Act applied for purposes of the 
whole of the Act (also its unfair discrimination provisions).161  These sections appear 
in Chapter III of the Act and deal with the determination of who are “suitably qualified 
persons” for purposes of affirmative action.162   According to the court in Dudley, 
section 20(5), which does mention and prohibit unfair discrimination, only does so in 
relation to the question as to who is “suitably qualified” for purposes of affirmative 
action.163  It simply does not apply to the whole of the Employment Equity Act.164  
The determination of who is “suitably qualified”, according to the court, is and 
remains a Chapter III issue which should be enforced via the Chapter V enforcement 
mechanisms.165  
 
In short section 20(5) does not give rise to a claim in terms of Chapter II.  It also does 
not bring about an individual right to affirmative action.166  The above principles apply 
not only in respect of the Employment Equity Act, but also in respect of an 
employer‟s employment equity plan. 
 
In the Harmse case the court found that the Employment Equity Act itself does, in 
effect, create a right to affirmative action, but left open the question whether the 
position would be the same in terms of an employer‟s employment equity plan 
designed in terms of the Employment Equity Act.167  In the Dudley case, the court 
found that: 
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“The conclusion that the applicant has no individual right to affirmative action in terms 
of the Employment Equity Act must also apply in relation to the City‟s affirmative action 
policy”.
168 
 
4.6 THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE HARMSE CASE AND THE DUDLEY 
CASE 
 
It would seem as if the battle lines have been firmly drawn.169  In the Harmse and 
Dudley case we have two directly conflicting judgments of the Labour Court on the 
relationship between affirmative action and unfair discrimination.170  The purpose of 
this contribution is not to rehash all the arguments for and against the different 
views.171  Suffice it to say that most of these arguments, albeit not always in so many 
words nor with the same structure and emphasis, are echoed in the arguments used 
by the court in Dudley.172  Thus, it is submitted, already means that for all the 
reasons why Harmse is wrong, Dudley is right.173 
 
It is however, useful to revisit and raise two issues.174   First, it is suggested that the 
merit of the Harmse case was that it forced us to consider the relationship between 
unfair discrimination and affirmative action against the background of the 
Constitution‟s commitment to substantive equality.175   In a sense it is easy to say, as 
was said in Dudley, that elimination of discrimination is a prerequisite for successful 
affirmative action but that these concepts otherwise remain distinct.176  But if we are 
serious about substantive equality (equality of outcome) is it not legitimate to ask (as 
was done in Harmse) whether affirmative action is a prerequisite for the elimination of 
discrimination?  The answer, it is suggested, remains no, simply because it is the 
wrong question to ask.177  It is wrong because it confuses measures and values.178  
Affirmative action is properly seen as a possible prerequisite to ensure equality of 
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outcome (not a prerequisite for the absence of discrimination).179  The point is that 
the value at stake is neither the elimination to unfair discrimination nor affirmative 
action.180  The value at stake is equality. Both the prohibition of unfair discrimination 
and the obligation to implement affirmative action are mere mechanisms in our 
endeavour to attain equality.181  The one, individually available remedy, is protection 
against unfair discrimination in order to ensure formal equality and equality of 
opportunity.  The other, affirmative action, is a group-based obligation to take equality 
a step further.182  As such, they are part of a merged package deal to ensure 
equality. It is only once we start confusing values with measures and elevate 
affirmative action to a value, that judgments such as Harmse ensue. And being a 
(mere) measure (as opposed to a value), affirmative action remains subject to the 
policy considerations, which underpin legislation such as the Employment Equity 
Act.183  As such, the judgment in Dudley is correct when it in effect says that we can 
do no more than to take affirmative action at the face value it was given by the 
legislature in the Employment Equity Act.184 
 
Ultimately, there is no individual right to appointment or promotion.185  Appointment 
and promotion, at best, may be described as a logical or rational consequence 
reached through the proper application of other rights, which do exist and may be 
enforced.186  These rights, which underpin appointment and promotion, do include 
the right not to be unfairly discriminated against, but do not include an individual right 
to affirmative action.187   
 
The judgment in the Dudley case also provides a solution to one apparently prickly 
issue raised by the wording of the Employment Equity Act.188  Section 5 of the Act, 
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within the context of the prohibition of unfair discrimination in Chapter II, places an 
obligation on all employers to:  
 
“Take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by eliminating unfair 
discrimination in any employment policy or practice”.
189 
 
In Dudley v City of Cape Town, the applicant, a black female, applied for the position 
of Director: City Health at the City of Cape Town but was unsuccessful.190  A white 
male was appointed instead.  The applicant alleged, firstly, that she had been unfairly 
discriminated against on the basis of race and / or sex in terms of section 6(1) of the 
Employment Equity Act.191  Secondly, she contended that the employer‟s failure to 
employ her constituted a breach of the employer‟s affirmative action obligations in 
terms of the Employment Equity Act.  Tip AJ in the Labour Court disagreed with 
Harmse v City of Cape Town by stating that affirmative action was collective in nature 
and did not entitle an individual to interfere with the programmatic and systematic 
application of affirmative action measures,192 where the court held that the aim of 
affirmative action is not to reward individuals, but to advance the categories of 
persons to which they belong.193  The Employment Equity Act specifically states that 
affirmative action disputes must be dealt with by the Director-General of Labour and 
that no employee can approach the Labour Court as a matter of first instance.194  
 
The court held that the interpretation of the Employment Equity Act in Harmse v City 
of Cape Town was incorrect.195  Tip AJ correctly stated that unfair discrimination is 
dealt with under chapter II of the Employment Equity Act, whilst chapter III is 
concerned with affirmative action.196   Accordingly, if affirmative action measures 
have been incorrectly applied, an enforcement issue falls under chapter III of the 
Employment Equity Act, not chapter II, because such a dispute is not an instance of 
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unfair discrimination.197  Section 20(5) of the Employment Equity Act relates only to 
the question of who is “suitably qualified” for the purpose of affirmative action and it 
does not apply to the entire Employment Equity Act.198  This interpretation is 
submitted to be correct.199 
 
These two conflicting decisions of the Labour Court have significant impact on other 
subsequent cases the reason being that it is the first two ground breaking cases 
dealing with the aspects of affirmative action.200  It is therefore necessary to observe 
how different courts interpret these two judgments.201   In my view, the absence of 
affirmative action was confused with unfair discrimination in Harmse v City of Cape 
Town.202  Taking this into account the correct way for the court to progress would be 
to follow the interpretation in Dudley v City of Cape Town.203  However, the nature 
and limits of a defence of affirmative action fall outside of the ambit of this discussion 
and due to time constraints will not be discussed in this thesis.204  
 
The court referred to the Dudley case, stating there was no such thing as an 
individual right to affirmative action.  Moreover, failure to comply with affirmative 
action measures under chapter III gave rise to an application to the Director-General 
of Labour under chapter V of the Employment Equity Act, not the enforcement 
mechanisms of chapter II.205  In no way does section 20 and Chapter II if read 
together create a right to affirmative action.206 
 
There are several cases concerning the right of affirmative action which was dealt 
with after the judgment delivered in the Dudley case.207  The first case was the case 
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of Cupido v GlaxoSmithKline SA (Pty) Ltd.208  The applicant, a coloured man, alleged 
that he had suffered racial discrimination when seeking promotion as Human 
Resources Officer.209  He alleged that as the respondent had failed to implement an 
employment equity plan as required by section 20 and 36 of the Employment Equity 
Act, the dispute fell under chapter III of the Act on affirmative action.210   The 
respondent excepted to this contention on the grounds that the applicant had no right 
of access to the Labour Court in terms of chapter III of the Act.211  The court clearly 
pointed out which case the courts supported and which not.  In this particular case 
the court pointed out that the reasoning applied by the court in the Harmse case was 
rejected whilst the construction of the Employment Equity Act in the Dudley case is 
clearly correct.212 
 
In a second case namely Willemse v Patelia213 the applicant, a disabled white male, 
applied for promotion as Director: Biodiversity Management at the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism.214  He had been recommended for the position 
by a selection committee that had noted his exceptional qualifications for the post.215  
But the Acting Director-General of the Department did not accept their 
recommendation because the applicant was not representative of the demographics 
of the country or in accordance with the imperative of transformation, and was 
obliged to give effect to the Constitution in this regard.216  The court held that the 
Director-General had acted with the sole purpose of enhancing gender 
representativity and had applied affirmative action in an arbitrary and unfair 
manner.217 
 
                                               
208
  (2005) 26 ILJ 868 (LC); Le Roux “Missed Promotions and Unfair Discrimination” 10. 
209
  Le Roux “Missed Promotions and Unfair Discrimination” 10. 
210
  Ibid. 
211
  Ibid. 
212
  Ibid. 
213
  (2007) 28 ILJ 428 (LAC); [2007] 2 BLLR 164 (LC); ZALC 19-10-2006 Case No 1161/2004; 
Coetzer “Affirmative Action: The Sword versus Shield Debate Continues” 98. 
214
  Coetzer “Affirmative Action: The Sword versus Shield Debate Continues” 98. 
215
  Ibid. 
216
  Ibid. 
217
  Ibid. 
32 
What is interesting is that the court in the Willemse case did not mention the Harmse 
case.  However, the court did mention the obligations imposed on employers to give 
effect to section 9(2) of the Constitution and provide for affirmative action 
measures.218   It did not dispute the legitimacy of such a defence in the case of an 
employer‟s implementing such measures, but it was far more concerned with how 
they were implemented.219  This decision illustrates well how the Employment Equity 
Act was designed to work, because the applicant‟s claim was brought under chapter 
II of the Employment Equity Act, and not chapter III, as was suggested in the Dudley 
case.220  Therefore, although the judgment does not directly discuss whether 
affirmative action is a right of a defence, it can be inferred, from the court‟s approach 
to the matter, that it supports the approach in the Dudley case.221  
 
In a third case namely Public Servants Association on behalf of Karriem v SA Police 
Service,222 the applicant, a coloured female, alleged that the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) had discriminated unfairly against her by failing to appoint her to an 
advertised post and appointed a white woman instead.223  The grounds of 
discrimination were claimed to be race (section 6 of the Employment Equity Act) or, 
alternatively, lack of experience (section 20).224  The evidence showed that the white 
woman who outscored the applicant in the objective criteria set for the position, and 
had been appointed because the SAPS‟s operational requirements required that the 
employee perform the necessary functions immediately.225 
 
The court held that there had been no unfair discrimination in this matter, since the 
appointment was made because of the very real and understandable operational 
requirements of the SAPS.226  Concerning the alleged breach of section 20 of the 
Employment Equity Act by the employer, the court held that claims relating to 
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affirmative action fell within chapter 5 of the Employment Equity Act, in which section 
36 sets out the relevant procedure to be followed.227   As a result, the court held, 
there was no independent individual right to affirmative action, neither was there a 
right of direct access to the Labour Court in respect of such a claim.  It is clear, then, 
that the court in this case agreed with the decision in the Dudley case.228   The court 
was, however, silent on the collective and systematic nature of affirmative action 
identified in the Dudley case.229 
 
In a fourth case namely Thekiso v IBM South Africa (Pty) Ltd230 the applicant was a 
black female who had been retrenched because of the operational requirements of 
the employer.231  In the Labour Court, she claimed that the employer‟s failure to 
consider certain requirements imposed by the Employment Equity Act rendered her 
dismissal unfair.232  She based this claim on section 15(2)(d)(ii) of the Employment 
Equity Act, which reads as follows: 
 
“(2)   Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer must include 
 (d) subject to subsection (3), measures to 
  (ii) retain and develop people from designated groups and to implement 
appropriate training measures, including measures in terms of an Act 
of Parliament providing for skills development.”
233 
 
The court held that a retrenched employee could not pursue a complaint before the 
Labour Court in terms of chapter III by alleging that her employer had breached its 
affirmative action obligations by retrenching her.234  Section 15(2)(d)(ii) of the 
Employment Equity Act did not impose any obligation on an employer to give 
preference to persons from designated groups when making a decision on possible 
retrenchments.235   The court further stated, referring to the Dudley case, that chapter 
III of the Employment Equity Act did not create an individual right to affirmative 
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action, and that there was also no right of direct access to the Labour Court in 
respect of a claim envisaged under that chapter.236  
 
With regard to the discussion on the Dudley case above it is clear that the court in 
this case accepted both arguments in regard to where there is a lack of affirmative 
action it cannot automatically constitute unfair discrimination.  An employee is in no 
position to approach the Labour Court in the first instance and then complain of the 
employer‟s breach of their affirmative action obligations.  The court accepted that 
irrespective that the Labour Court is the best or appropriate forum when it comes to 
the dealing with individual unfair discrimination claims or matters, the same cannot 
be said of issues relating to affirmative action.  Such issues must be dealt with in 
terms of Chapter 5 of the Employment Equity Act.  However the Employment Equity 
Act makes it clear that a person can approach the Labour Court to seek a remedy but 
only after the intervention of the Director-General of Labour but the fact that 
affirmative action is a group-based obligation and not an individual right must be kept 
in mind.  Thus, the elimination of discrimination is a pre-requisite of successful 
affirmative action and these concepts remain distinct from one another.   
 
Sharing the view of Christopher Garbers, I am of the view that the judgment in the 
Dudley case was correctly decided when it was decided that there was nothing more 
than to take affirmative action at the face value that it was given by legislature in the 
Employment Equity Act and the solution provided by the wording of the Employment 
Equity Act. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
WHEN DOES AFFIRMATIVE ACTION RESULT IN UNFAIR 
DISCRIMINATION? 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of affirmative action has usually come before the courts in two contexts‟.237  
The first, and most common context, is where an employer attempts to use 
affirmative action as a defence against a claim brought by an employee claiming that 
he or she have been unfairly discriminated against, or otherwise unfairly treated.238  
This context is regarded as a shield.  The second context has been where an 
employee has argued that he or she should have been promoted because the 
employer was required to implement affirmative action measures.239  This context is 
regarded as a sword.  Both of these two contexts‟ will be discussed below.  The 
following will also be addressed in this chapter namely, affirmative action as a 
defence rather than a right, the importance of the merits and the needs of the 
community in terms of affirmative action and lastly the differentiation amongst 
members of designated groups. 
 
5.2 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AS A DEFENCE 
 
In terms of the first context an important question arises namely whether an employer 
can only rely on affirmative action considerations as a defence in the situation where 
the employer has adopted a formal affirmative action policy.  In this regard the court 
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had the opportunity to consider this question in the case of Gordon v Department of 
Health: Kwazulu-Natal.240  
 
In this case a white male namely Dr Gordon and a black male namely Mr Mkongwa 
applied for the post as Deputy Director: Administration at Grey Hospital in 
Pietermaritzburg.241  The applicant, Dr Gordon was an employee of the respondent 
since February 1967.242  Dr Gordon was an assistant administration clerk and was 
promoted to an assistant senior administration clerk in 1972.243  Thereafter in 1978 
as an administration officer, in 1985 as a senior administration officer and in 1992 as 
an assistant director of Midlands Hospital Complex comprising of Fort Napier 
hospital, Townhill and Umgeni‟s C&R centres.244  The applicant then applied for the 
position.  After interviewing all the candidates that applied for the post, the selection 
panel decided that the Applicant was the most suitable candidate for the post.245  The 
reason being that he had experience in leadership, planning and control 
competencies.246  The selection panel was not the only ones with this view.  The 
Head of Department of Health in the Province shared the same view.247  However the 
Provincial Public Service Commission disagreed with the view of the selection panel 
and the head of the Department of Health and was of the opinion that Mr Mkongwa 
should be appointed due to his academic qualifications, experience and constituted 
imperative to promote representativity in the public service.248  At the end, Mr 
Mkongwa was appointed for the job. 
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Dr Gordon applied to the Labour Court stating that the Respondent, his employer 
was unfairly discriminating against him when he was refused the appointment to the 
post.249  The Labour Court came to the conclusion that there had been no unfair 
discrimination.250  It held that appointing Dr Gordon would have given effect to the 
constitutional imperative of promoting equality and transforming the public service.251  
For this reason he was not the most suitable candidate.252  The failure to appoint Dr 
Gordon therefore did not amount to unfair discrimination and his claim was 
dismissed.253 
 
However, Dr Gordon was not satisfied with the outcome of the Labour Court and took 
the matter on appeal.  On appeal, the Labour Appeal Court decided the matter on the 
issue of joinder.254  Dr Gordon‟s claim did not succeed because of the failure to join 
Mr Mkongwa as a party to the proceedings and the matter was referred to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (hereinafter referred to as the SCA) to deal on the 
matter.255  It was argued in the SCA on behalf of Dr Gordon that the employer had 
acted in an inherently arbitrary manner due to the fact that there was no rational 
policy, plan or programme in place within the employers‟ organisation which justified 
its decision not to appoint him because of his race.256  This constituted unfair 
discrimination as envisaged in Item 2(1)(a) of Schedule 7 of the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995.257 
 
Section 6 of the Employment Equity Act repealed and replaced this provision.  
However even though the provision is repealed and replaced, the provision retains its 
relevance.258  It remained unfair discrimination even if it was taken in the context of 
the constitutional imperative to advance persons, or groups, or categories of persons 
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who had previously been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.259  The defence 
raised by the employer to this effect was that its decision to appoint Mr Mkongwa was 
“immune from judicial scrutiny” because it was “in itself” designed to achieve the 
constitutional imperative of promoting equality.260  
 
The Court however described the question to be considered as follows:  
 
“The question therefore is whether the appointment of Mr Mkongwa, a black candidate, 
instead of the appellant, a white candidate, found more suitable by the selection panel, 
is immunised from judicial scrutiny by the respondent‟s ipse dixit, without more, that it 
was an affirmative action appointment in furtherance of the constitutional imperative of 
promoting equality.”
261
  
 
To this effect, the SCA accepted that Dr Gordon had been unfairly discriminated 
against on account of his race.262  He had not been appointed because he was 
white.263  The question to be considered was whether the failure to promote could be 
considered fair on the basis that it was motivated by affirmative action 
considerations.264 
 
The fairness of the employer‟s actions could be justified on the basis of affirmative 
action as envisaged by section 8 of the Interim Constitution and Item 2 of Schedule 7 
of the Labour Relations Act.  This was clearly pointed out by the court.  In essence 
these provisions permitted unequal treatment where the objective of this treatment 
was to promote equality. The Constitution contemplated a “substantive” as opposed 
to a “formal” type of equality.  The court also observed that affirmative action was 
unquestionably “the most embraced means” to promote equality. 
 
The question was whether the appointment of Mr Mkongwa fell within the ambit of 
these sections?265  Was it designed to achieve the constitutional imperative of 
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promoting equality?266  As indicated above, the employer argued that this was the 
case, even if it was ad hoc in nature.267  The court referred to a number of cases 
dealing with the validity of policies and plans dealing with affirmative action where it 
had been held that measures found to be inherently arbitrary and irrational cannot be 
said to have been designed to achieve the objective of the constitutional imperative 
of equality.268  It expressed the following view: 
 
“It is apparent from the cited cases that the plans and / or policies at issue were 
subjected to scrutiny to determine if they were rationally connected with the 
constitutional imperative of promoting and / or achieving equality and that ad hoc and 
random action was found to be incapable of meeting the objective.  From this it can be 
deducted that properly formulated programmes go a long way to satisfying the 
requirement of rationally.  This is so since a properly crafted programme or policy 
provides a basis upon which it can be measured as to whether it meets the 
constitutional objective.  In Public Servants Association of South Africa v Department of 
Justice there was no policy or plan in place but an ad hoc arrangement which was 
found to be random and haphazard and therefore not designed to achieve the required 
purpose.  See, also, Eskom v Hiemstra NO (1999) 20 ILJ 2362 (LC).  This, in my view, 
clearly shows that the term “ measures” as set out in section 8(3) as well as the terms 
“practices” and “policies” in item 2(2)(b) of Schedule 7 of the LRA mean something 
much more than mere ad hoc or random action as we have in this case”.
269
 
 
“The injunction that the public service must be broadly representative is an important 
one.  It enjoins those in charge to strive towards representivity.  Tis in my view calls for 
attention to be focused on the respects in which the service is not representative and 
what measures should be implemented to achieve the required representivity. This 
suggests that a properly considered policy or plan to address the situation as opposed 
to ad hoc means is the way to go to achieve representivity.  It must therefore be so that 
ad hoc and random action is impermissible” “The injunction that the public service must 
be broadly representative is an important one. It enjoins those in charge to strive 
towards representivity.  This in my view calls for attention to be focused on the respects 
in which the service is not representative and what measures should be implemented 
to achieve the required representivity. This suggests that a properly considered policy 
or plan to address the situation as opposed to ad hoc means is the way to go to 
achieve representivity. It must therefore be so that ad hoc and random action is 
impermissible”.
270
 
 
The SCA then examined the evidence led by the employer in this regard.271  It found 
that Mr Mkongwa‟s race was the only basis on which his appointment was justified 
and this was linked to the constitutional imperative of promoting equality and this 
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being the case even though the selection panel did not support his appointment.272  
The employer did not have a policy or overarching plan of affirmative action.273  The 
witness from the Provincial Public Service Commission (which had overridden the 
decision of the selection panel) who testified on behalf of the employer had not 
provided “a coherent basis” for rejecting the selection panel‟s recommendation.274  
His view was simply that this was a case where affirmative action had to be 
implemented.275  His evidence demonstrated that the Commission itself had not 
applied their minds to the implementation of affirmative action and they simply held a 
view that a black candidate should be appointed.276  He could provide no evidence to 
demonstrate how the appointment would have made the relevant department more 
representative.277  Nor was there any factual basis of demographics which may have 
promoted the commission to make the decision it did.278  The appointment was 
inherently arbitrary and therefore unfair.279  It did not fall within the affirmative action 
defence envisaged in section 8(3) of the Constitution.280 
 
The court also stated that, in the absence of an affirmative action policy or plan, the 
employer was required to comply with the legislative framework that applied at that 
time, including the Interim Constitution and the Public Service Act 103 of 1994.  It 
came to the following conclusion: 
 
“There is clear emphasis in these provisions that suitable candidates cannot be denied 
appointment it they comply with stipulated requirements, even though representivity is 
the objective.  Therefore, in the quest to attain representivity, efficiency and fairness 
were not to be compromised. To justify the failure to appoint a candidate who complied 
with stipulated requirements it had to be shown that, that action was not unfair.  The 
evidence at our disposal is clear that the respondent did not have an affirmative action 
plan or policy in terms of which it appointed Mr Mkongwa. The evidence is also clear 
that the selection panel found the appellant to be the most suitable candidate and 
recommended that he be appointed. It is also common cause that the appellant 
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complied with all the requirements for the post in terms of section 11(1)(b) of the PSA. 
In the light of all these facts, it was clearly unfair not to appoint him.”
281
 
 
The Labour Court had therefore been incorrect to conclude that it was not a 
requirement for the employer to have had an affirmative action plan or programme in 
place before appointing Mr Mkongwa. 
 
5.3  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, SAFETY AND PROTECTED DISCLOSURE 
WHEN COMPLAINING ABOUT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION MAY BE 
JUSTIFIED AND PROTECTED  
 
Recently, a complex matter had to be decided in the case of Engineering Council of 
South Africa & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & Another.282  In 
this case the court had to deal not only with protected disclosures but with 
employment equity, affirmative action, managerial responsibilities, workplace and 
public safety.  
 
It was, in a very real sense, about all of these issues in one way or another, mixed 
together in a complex brew.  The decision in this regard is of particular importance as 
it shows how each aspect has to find some way of co-existence in a specific work 
more particularly a single manager.   
 
The manager occupied the position as managing engineer of power systems control 
as the municipality.283  The manager was in terms of the Engineering Profession Act 
46 of 2000, a registered professional engineer.284   His duties consist of managing 
and controlling the relevant control system and to ensure, amongst others, that the 
correct safety measures and configurations were applied in the city‟s electricity 
networks “thereby striving to continuity, quality and safety of electrical supply to all 
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consumers” according to his job description.285  His further responsibilities included 
the recruitment and appointment of system operators who could do previous work 
without endangering their own lives, the safety of the public or the safety of other 
employees.286  The section over which the Employer was in charge, did work that 
was extremely dangerous, involving operations on live, high-voltage electrical 
networks and there was no doubt with regard to that.287 
 
The system operators needed specific and specialized knowledge and skills and any 
mistakes could lead to a number of households, even whole suburbs, being plunged 
into darkness, because of the nature of the work.288  If an unqualified person was 
appointed to the post of system operator it could mean that the person is a danger, 
both to himself and his colleagues.289  In the court papers, the employer referred to 
an incident that led to the electrocution and death of a child because one employer 
whose limited knowledge of the safety and operational procedures (together with his 
lack of relevant field experience), was the cause of the accident.290  The problem 
arose when some of the managers required the employee to appoint system 
operators who, in his view, did not have the necessary skills.291  The crux of the 
matter was that the employee raised his concerns at high level meetings with senior 
managers.292  This proved fruitless and then the employee refused to co-operate in 
the recruitment of people who he felt did not have the necessary knowledge, skills or 
experience.293  All this things came to a head when the employee wrote a letter to 
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senior managers in the municipality.294  He also copied the letter to the Department 
of Labour and to the Engineering Council.295  
 
This letter prompted the employer to the disciplinary action against him and the 
vexing letter was dated the 31st of August 2005 and the employee received the 
disciplinary charges on 02 February 2006.296  The other charges were abandoned 
and the essence of the charge brought against the employee was that the letter that 
was written and sent to the Department of Labour and the Engineering Council was 
done without the necessary authorisation or prior approval or knowledge of the 
municipality‟s Head of the Electricity Department.297  It was the municipality‟s view 
that the employee should, at the very least, have brought his concerns to the 
attention of the highest managerial levels within the municipality.298 
 
This process progressed at a snail‟s pace or worse.299  At the disciplinary enquiry 
that commenced in May 2006, the employee pleaded not guilty.300  The employee 
was eventually found guilty and he was further informed that the enquiry would 
resume in January 2007, to decide on a sanction.301  The High Court in February 
2007 granted an interim interdict restraining the employer from imposing any 
disciplinary sanction on the employee for his actions or conduct in sending copies of 
the letter to the Engineering Council and to the Department of Labour.302  The 
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manager at no stage, deny that he wrote the letter or copied the letter to the 
Engineering Council or to the Department of Labour.303   
 
In court, there was some sort of debate, with regard to the employment equity 
aspects that arose.304  The manager‟s section was seriously understaffed and the 
employees who worked in that section had to work unacceptable high levels of 
overtime.305  There was an urgent need to appoint new operators and the manager 
prepared a test for the selection for a foreman and system operators.306  The 
manager‟s immediate superior approved the test and the test was approved by 
human resources management.307  The posts were advertised internally, and the top 
four candidates (all white) scored between 62% and 42%.308  The next eight 
candidates (all whites) scored between 38% and 21%. The only employment equity 
applicant came in at 12% - the manager felt that the latter could not be appointed as 
he would endanger his own life and others (this candidate was subsequently 
appointed by the employer).309  A shortlist was compiled, containing the names of the 
top four candidates.310  Human resources management did not approve of this  an at 
a meeting certain steps were agreed to: four operators would be appointed from the 
competent group (as indicated by the test results), and four other posts would be re-
advertised and filled from a group of people who had the necessary qualifications 
and who could be trained within a reasonable time.311  The employer duly placed an 
advertisement for system operators in a newspaper known as Pretoria News and 
more than 120 applications were received.312  Only 15 of these were employment 
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equity candidates with the required electrician‟s trade certificate and some 
experience.313  Only 11 turned up to take the test, and the test scores ranged from 
32% to 2%.314 
 
But then a new broom (a newly appointed General Manager: Electricity Development 
and Energy Business) been sweeping, and torpedoed all the efforts that had been 
made to appoint system operators from both the white and the employment equity 
ranks.315  The High Court quotes two e-mails written by the new General Manager.316  
Unequivocally, he states that candidates who failed to meet employment equity 
targets were not to be shortlisted at all.317  In a similar vein, he indicated to the 
manager that the previous agreements reached in respect of the posts were no 
longer recognized.318  The tests were now to be approved by the senior manager and 
human resources management was to conduct the testing without the manager‟s 
involvement.319 
 
On the advice of the Engineering Council, the manager then wrote the letter that 
would lead to so much trouble for all concerned.320  According to the High Court, his 
concerns were genuine and there could be no doubting his good faith.321  For the 
senior manager, of course, the manager demonstrated a lack of commitment to 
transformation and disciplinary measures had to be taken.322 
 
The first point the High Court made was to place emphasis on the balance between 
employment equity and safety: 
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“In all these circumstances, I fail to see how I can express approval for actions aimed 
at achieving (and accelerating) equity transformation at all costs and in disregard of 
safety consideration. This must be particularly true in the case of a lethal commodity 
like high voltage electricity. In my view there must be a sensible balance between 
considerations of employment equity on the one side and safety on other side.”
323
 
 
But the case was not about employment equity, said the High Court and only the 
Labour Court would have jurisdiction in that regard.324  The case was solely about the 
manager‟s letter under the circumstances and the question whether the manager 
enjoyed the protection of various pieces of legislation.325  Several important pieces of 
legislation were discussed and taken into account in the present case namely, the 
Engineering Profession Act, the Occupational Health and Safety Act, the Constitution 
and the Protected Disclosures Act.  Due to space and time constrains these four acts 
will merely briefly be discussed below.  
 
The first piece of legislation considered by the High Court in the present case was 
the Engineering Profession Act.326  The court found that the Engineering Profession 
Act effectively gave protection to the manager‟s disclosure; in terms of the rules 
(Rules of Conduct for Registered Persons) this was a disclosure he was in essence 
obliged to make.327  The manager acted in good faith and he reasonably believed 
that the actions of his employer endangered (or were likely to endanger) the health 
and safety of the public or fellow employees.328  The employee could not be held 
legally liable for writing the letter the disciplinary enquiry was unlawful and was to be 
restrained by an interdict.329 
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The second piece of legislation dealt with was the Occupational Health and Safety 
Act 85 of 1993 and regulations made in terms of the Act.330  In this context the High 
Court agreed with a submission made on behalf of the employee that an employee 
who is forced by his employer to expose himself to potential penalties is entitled to 
report this to the relevant authorities.331  At the same time, the employee can claim 
protection against victimization provided for in section 26(1) of the Occupational 
Health and safety Act.332  The disciplinary proceedings against the manager 
contravened section 26 of this Act and they were to be restrained by interdict.333  It is 
clear from the discussion above that the act emphases the importance of work place 
safety.334 
 
Thirdly, naturally, constitutional issues are at stake, and here the High Court‟s 
decision is astounding because of the extreme ease with which the Court links the 
employee‟s actions to section 16 of the Constitution (freedom of expression) and the 
labour rights in section 23.335  The municipality‟s actions infringed on these two rights 
and left it there.336 
 
The last piece of legislation considered by the court is the Protected Disclosures Act 
26 of 2000.337  The court found that the employee had been subjected to an 
occupational detriment (as defined in the Protection Disclosure Act) at least by being 
suspended.338  After quoting section 9 of the Protection Disclosure Act (making of a 
general disclosure), the High Court said the following: 
 
                                               
330
  Mischke “Affirmative Action, Safety and Protected Disclosure: When Complaining about 
Affirmative Action may be Justified and Protected” 69. 
331
  Engineering Council of South Africa & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & 
Another 47 par 97. 
332
  Engineering Council of South Africa & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & 
Another 45 par 91 and 48 par 98. 
333
  Engineering Council of South Africa & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & 
Another 48 par 100. 
334
  Engineering Council of South Africa & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & 
Another 47 par 97. 
335
  Engineering Council of South Africa & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & 
Another 49 par 104. 
336
  Ibid. 
337
  Ibid.  
338
  Engineering Council of South Africa & another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality & 
Another 51 par 106. 
48 
“In my opinion, Weyers made a general protected disclosure, as intended by section 9 
and, consequently, is entitled to the protection afforded by section 3: he reasonably 
believed that the information disclosed and any allegations therein are substantially 
true. He did not make the disclosure for purposes of personal gain. It was reasonable 
to make the disclosure. Weyers had previously made a disclosure of substantially the 
same information to his employer in respect of which no action was taken within a 
reasonable period after the disclosure, and the impropriety; in my view, is of an 
exceptionally serious nature.
339
 
 
Moreover, the reasonableness of the disclosure, when tested against the provisions 
of section 9(3), is manifest.  If nothing else, it was in the public interest.340  Section 
4(1)(a) provides that an employee may approach any court having jurisdiction, 
including the Labour Court, for relief sought.341  This clearly meant, said the High 
Court, that an aggrieved person may, in terms of the Protection Disclosure Act, 
approach any court with jurisdiction, including the Labour Court.342  This provision in 
the Protection Disclosure Act does not appear to oust the jurisdiction of the High 
Court.343   
 
5.4  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ONLY A DEFENCE (SHIELD) AND NOT A RIGHT 
(SWORD) 
 
While it is true that the Constitution guarantees substantive equality, it is now well 
established that once parliament has enacted legislation to give effect to a 
constitutional right, a litigant may no longer rely on the constitutional provision itself.  
He must either rely on the legislation passed by parliament to enforce his rights or he 
must challenge the constitutionality of the legislation.344  Transformation in the 
workplace is governed by the Employment Equity Act.  Weaker employees from 
designated groups who want to claim that their employers have treated them unfairly 
by not having given preference to them over stronger candidates must therefore rely 
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on the Employment Equity Act and may not rely directly on the right to substantive 
equality in the Constitution. 
 
The Employment Equity Act only permits employers to rely on affirmative action. 
These employers are permitted to do by relying on affirmative action as a defence 
(shield) against a claim of unfair discrimination.345  An employee on the other hand is 
not permitted by the Employment Equity Act to rely on affirmative action as a cause 
of action (sword) against an employer and may therefore not approach a court or 
tribunal complaining that he or she should have benefited from affirmative action.346  
The remedy against employers who do not implement affirmative action is through 
the Department of Labour and not through the Courts or arbitrators. 
 
In terms of the Employment Equity Act it is the task of the Department of Labour (and 
not employees, courts or arbitrators) to act against employers who do not comply 
with their obligations to implement affirmative action.347 There are indeed good policy 
considerations for not permitting employees to rely on affirmative action as a cause 
of action.348  One important reason why an individual employee cannot rely on 
affirmative action as a cause of action is because affirmative action is not aimed at 
benefiting specific individuals, but aimed at a designated group as a whole.  
Therefore in Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association v EEOC, the 
Court held that the purpose of affirmative action 
 
“is not to make identified victim whole, but rather to dismantle prior patterns of 
employment discrimination to  prevent  discrimination in the future. Such relief is 
provided to the class as a whole rather than to individual members; no individual is 
entitled to relief …”.
349
  
 
If this were to change, and if individual employees were to be permitted to rely on 
affirmative action as a cause of action, then the whole basis upon which affirmative 
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action is premised, namely that it is the right of the group and aimed at benefiting the 
group and not the individual within the group falls away. This would then mean that 
individual members would also loose the benefit of not having to show actual 
disadvantage under discriminatory laws and that employers will also have to cross 
that additional hurdle in order to prove that discrimination in the name of affirmative 
action was fair. 
 
5.5  THE IMPORTANCE OF MERIT AND THE NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY  
 
One may never forget that the Constitution requires the creation of not only a 
representative public service, but also one which is efficient.350  Although it is true 
that efficiency is not completely separate and antagonistic to the requirement of 
representivity,351 public servants must indeed be adequately qualified in order to 
render an efficient service to the public.  When applying affirmative action measures 
in making promotions of appointments, it must be born in mind that equity is not the 
only criterion.352  Some occupations may even be considered to be so important or 
dangerous, that the implementation of affirmative action policies at all costs and 
irrespective of other considerations will not be permissible merely to make the job 
category more representative. In such cases it may constitute unfair discrimination to 
pass over the best candidate.353 
 
An employer may only give preferential treatment to suitably qualified people from 
designated groups.354  The Act provides that a person may be suitably qualified for a 
job as a result of any one of, or any combination of that person‟s formal 
qualifications, prior learning, relevant experience or capacity to acquire, within a 
reasonable time, the ability to do the job.355 
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Despite the fact that the Act provides a fairly wide definition of suitably qualified 
persons for purposes of affirmative action, experience and qualifications are always 
relevant and may never be ignored.  The real challenge is to determine to what 
extent merit, experience and qualifications may be sacrificed for the appointment of a 
weaker candidate from a designated group in the name of affirmative action.  One 
method is the so-called “tie breaker” or the “relatively equal test”: 
 
“The relatively test is not so favourable to the affirmative action applicant.  That test 
requires that if one of the candidates is notably better qualified and capable of filling the 
vacancy, that candidate would be appointed, regardless of any preference 
considerations.  However, if the two candidates are relatively equal in qualification, 
experience and ability, then the affirmative action candidate should be appointed.”
356
  
 
The relatively equal test tends to reward those privileged in the past and, whilst 
recognizing their expertise and seniority, leaves the need for transformation in 
specific grades unresolved and makes it difficult to attain true transformation.357  
Therefore the better view is that a gab between the skills, experience and 
qualifications of a person who is preferred and appointed in the name of affirmative 
action, over another with superior qualifications and experience, is indeed 
permitted.358  However the appointment of an unqualified or incompetent person is 
however never permitted in the name of affirmative action, because equity is not the 
only consideration to be applied when making appointments.359  Merit and the needs 
of the community always play an important role, even in affirmative action disputes: 
 
“Applying a higher standard for non- designated groups implies that a lower standard is 
used to appoint persons from designated groups.  By implication, less suitable and less 
meritorious people fill posts reserved for designated groups.  That cannot be the 
intention or the letter and spirit of the EEA…..Equity means fairness and justice, to the 
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candidate and to the people they serve.  Fairness and justice cannot prevail if 
candidates who are less that best, who are less suitable and less meritorious are 
appointed. However, is assessing suitability and merit, technical competence and 
experience are not the only criteria. Acquiring a high aggregate is also not 
decisive….Equity on the one hand and merit and suitability on the other hand are not 
mutually exclusive criteria….Promoting equity in the workplace can therefore not 
conflict with or compromise the constitutional promise, which includes equitable 
delivery of goods, socio economic rights and benefits and services, including security 
services. Equity is therefore not only a workplace concern but also a community 
concern.  Therefore, in assessing merit and suitability, qualities relevant to ensuring 
delivery to the community must also be considered.”
360
 
 
So for example Landman J in Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety & Security 
ordered the South African Police Services on the basis of community needs, to 
promote white inspectors in the explosives unit (the bomb squad) when no members 
of designated groups applied, and when the employer refused to promote them 
because it wanted to reserve the posts for members of designated groups.361  
Although there can be a considerable gap as far as merit is concerned between the 
weaker candidate from the designated group the employer wants to appoint another 
stronger candidate, the gap between two candidates may not be too substantial, 
because if it is, appointment of the weaker candidate in the name of affirmative action 
will be irrational.362  This is true especially in the education sector because in 
appointing educators, the best interest of the learners are of paramount 
importance363 and the employer‟s duty to implement affirmative action should be 
balanced against the need to provide the highest standard of education to its 
students. 364  
 
Whether the gap between two candidates is too substantial is a factual dispute. It is 
the duty of an arbitrator to assess in each case whether the gap between the 
candidates in that particular case was sufficiently substantial to have caused 
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appointment of the weaker candidate in the name of affirmative action to be irrational.  
The extent to which a gap between the qualifications and experience of the two 
candidates will be permissible, will not only depend on the needs of the community 
and public interest, but will also depend on the job level and nature of the job.365  A 
wider gap would for example be permissible in a dispute concerning a post level 2 
position than in the case of a school principal position. 
 
5.6 DIFFERENTIATING AMONGST MEMBERS OF DESIGNATED GROUPS 
 
The issue whether it is permissible to differentiate between members of different 
designated groups when applying affirmative action measures, is a sensitive one, 
which has sparked a heated debate.  The reality however is that even amongst the 
designated groups, there is a need to promote representivity.  Our courts have in fact 
recognized that the achievement of a broadly representative workforce at all levels 
will not be possible if employers are not permitted to differentiate between candidates 
who fall within designated groups and that it is indeed permissible and fair to 
discriminate between members of designated groups in order to promote 
representivity in the workplace.366  The test to be used to differentiate between 
members of different designated groups when applying affirmative action, must 
however be fair. 
 
In order to determine whether it is permissible to prefer a member of one designated 
group over a member of another designated group in order to achieve representivity, 
some Courts and arbitrators have resorted to the “degrees of disadvantage” test. In 
terms of this test, a hierarchy is created in terms of which it is then said that members 
of the designated group who suffered most under apartheid, should receive 
preferential treatment to those who suffered less under apartheid.367  There are 
however several problems with the “degrees of disadvantage” test.  Firstly, it could 
be very difficult to determine which group suffered more than the other under 
discriminatory legislation.  Secondly, there is no support for this test in the 
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Employment Equity Act.  The Act promotes the equitable representation of all 
designated groups in the workplace; it does not rank designated groups in 
accordance with race and / or gender.  Lastly, instead of integrating our society, this 
test leads to more alienation amongst members of the various designated groups in 
that a particular designated group may feel that despite the discrimination suffered by 
members of that group in the past, the members of that group are still being treated 
as second or third class citizens. 
 
Professor Du Toit argues that instead of using the concept of “degrees of 
disadvantage” a test determining whether and to what extent members of certain 
designated groups should be preferred over members of other designated groups, 
the test of representivity (namely the equal representation of all designated groups) 
in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce should rather be used.368  
Dupper and Garbers also support this test and explain this test as follows: 
 
“Equitable representation of persons from designated groups is integral to the concept 
of affirmative action (see section 15(1) of the EEA), and the degree to which persons of 
particular racial or gender groups are underrepresented in a particular occupational 
category or level within a workplace should determine the appropriateness of 
affirmative action in respect of applicants from particular groups.  For example, if the 
facts show that African women are most severely underrepresented in a job category of 
an employer operating in the Western Cape, the employer will be justified in giving 
preference to female African applicants who are suitably qualified.  Similarly if Coloured 
men are underrepresented in certain job categories of an employer in the Northern 
Province, suitably qualified candidates from this group may receive preferential 
treatment over African men who may already be sufficiently represented in that job 
category.  This approach is more closely compatible with the purpose of the EEA and 
more sensitive to regional and industry peculiarities.”
369
 
 
It is clear from above that this test of representavity is the most appropriate test to be 
used in differentiating between members of different designated groups and this is in 
fact the test adopted by most education departments. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS PERMISSIBLE (LAWFUL) AND 
REGARDED AS A DEFENCE 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter the instances when affirmative action results in unfair 
discrimination was discussed.  In this chapter a discussion will embark on when 
affirmative action is permissible and regarded as a defence.  This chapter will discuss 
the abovementioned topic with reference to the Employment Equity Act739 and case 
law. 
 
6.2 WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS PERMISSIBLE (LAWFUL) AND 
REGARDED AS A DEFENCE WITH REFERENCE TO THE EMPLOYMENT 
EQUITY ACT  
 
Practically, the most typical example is in situations where a white male is refused 
employment and the person who gets the job or employed falls within one of the 
designated groups.740  In situations such as the real or statutory basis for a claim by 
the unsuccessful white male applicant is based on unfair discrimination in terms of 
section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act.741  Section 6(1) provides that “no person 
may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly against any employee in any 
employment policy or practice on one or more grounds including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political, culture, 
language and birth”.742  Section 9 of the same Act further states that for the purpose 
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of section 6, the term employee includes an applicant for employment or for a job.743  
Section 1 of the Act also defines any employment policy or practice to include the 
following such as recruitment procedures, appointments, advertising, selection 
criteria, promotions and dismissals.744  
 
Where an employer are faced with a claim of discrimination based on race and sex 
than the employer may argue that there was no discrimination on this basis and that 
the person who was employed was simply the better candidate based on the merit.745  
The fact that the successful applicant was a member of a designated group was 
irrelevant in the selection process.746  Based on this and if that can be established, 
there will be no discrimination.747  However the employer could also admit that the 
successful candidate was appointed on the basis of the fact that he / she was black, 
woman or a person with a disability, and the applicant was not considered because 
he was white and a male, and argues that this was done as an affirmative action 
measure.748  The employer would be then relying on section 6(2) of the Employment 
Equity Act.749 
 
Section 15 of the Employment Equity Act states that affirmative action measures are 
“measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups 
have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workplace of a designated employer”.750 
 
Section 15(2) of the Act spells out in more detail what affirmative action measures an 
employer must implement when drawing up affirmative action plans in terms of 
Chapter 3 and they include: 
 
a) measures to further diversity in the workplace, 
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b) measures to identify and eliminate employment barriers, including unfair 
discrimination which adversely affects people from designated groups, and 
 
c) measures to ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified persons 
from designated groups in all the occupational categories and levels in the 
workplace including preferential treatment and numerical goals. 
 
The Labour Court will usually scrutinise affirmative action measures to determine 
whether they meet the requirements of section 15, that they are consistent with the 
purposes of the Employment Equity Act and whether the requirements of the 
Employment Equity Act are met.751   
 
6.3 WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IS PERMISSIBLE (LAWFUL) AND 
REGARDED AS A DEFENCE WITH REFERENCE TO CASE LAW  
 
Apart from the effect of the Employment Equity Act of rendering affirmative action 
permissible in certain instances as discussed above, the effect of case law also 
needs to be addressed and will be discussed below.   
 
Firstly, in the case of Public Servants Association v Minister of Justice752 the decision 
of the Department of Justice to reserve certain posts for affirmative action candidates 
was challenged by the applicant.753  The interpretation of various statutory provisions 
was orbited in this case.754  Several of the interim Constitution provisions were dealt 
with namely section 212 and section 8 respectively.755  In terms of section 212 an 
efficient public administration broadly representative of the South African community 
should be promoted by the Public Service.756  Section 8 on the other hand prohibits 
discrimination and entrenches the right of equality, more particularly section 
8(3)(2).757  This section did not preclude measures designated to achieve the 
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adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in order to enable their full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.758  In this case a formal approach was adopted 
by the court and the court provided instances where discrimination in terms of 
affirmative action is fair.759 These principles are as follows: firstly, affirmative action 
measures must be specifically designated to achieve the goal of the adequate 
protection and advancement of persons subject to past unfair discrimination.760  
Secondly, there must be a causal connection between affirmative action measures 
that have been designated and their objectives.761  Thirdly, the interests and the 
rights of the community should be taken into account.762  Thus, even though 
affirmative action measures must be designated to achieve adequate protection and 
advancement, the rights and interests of the community must not be undermined.763  
Lastly, an efficient public administration should not be compromised by Public 
Service.764  The court came to the conclusion that the affirmative action measures 
adopted by the Department of Justice were invalid due to the fact that the 
abovementioned principles were not adhered to.765 
 
In the second case of MWU obo Van Coller v Eskom766 the employer had appointed 
a coloured candidate to a post instead of a white woman who was a better qualified 
employee for the position.767  The arbitrator held that the employer wishing to rely on 
affirmative action as a defence against a charge of unfair discrimination must prove 
that it acted according to the standards developed to achieve specific objectives, that 
those standards are aimed at adequate protection and advancement of groups or 
categories of persons and that rights of other persons and efficiency of the employer 
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are not undermined.768  The employer failed to prove the above and its refusal to 
promote the employee was held to be unfair.769    
 
In the third case namely the Department of Correctional Services v Van Vuuren770 a 
white women where after 12 years of service with the appellant, the Respondent 
applied for a higher position in the department and was highly recommended, the 
Commissioner or Prisons decided to appoint a recommended candidate, a black 
man.771  The Industrial Court held that the appellant had committed an unfair labour 
practice against the Respondent on the basis that the affirmative action policy upon 
which the Commissioner of Prisons had relied had not yet been registered with the 
Public Service Commission (PSC).772  It further held that such registration was 
necessary before the Commissioner could make a decision based on the guidelines 
set out in the policy.773  On appeal the court held that the Commissioner was 
competent to decide whom to appoint to the post.774 
 
The court further held that while the Constitution prohibits discrimination based on 
race, it also provides that the right to equality does not preclude measures designed 
to achieve the adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or 
categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in order to enable their 
full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.775  It further held that a state 
department is not acting unfairly by appointing a black man in preference to a white 
woman merely because the affirmative action policy was not yet registered with the 
Public Service Commission.776 
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In the fourth case of NEHAWU obo Thomas v Department of Justice777 the grievant 
approached the relevant bargaining council with a dispute to determine whether the 
department‟s failure to promote him to the post of Assistant Director: Employment 
Equity constituted an unfair labour practice in terms of Item 2(1)(b) of Schedule 7 of 
the LRA.778 
 
The first issue which needed to be addressed was whether the arbitrator had 
jurisdiction and whether the dispute fell within the council‟s jurisdiction.779  The 
arbitrator was of the opinion that they did in fact have jurisdiction to hear and deal 
with the matter.780  The reasoning behind this being that the grievant and his union 
did not allege or rely on any ground which fell outside the jurisdiction such as 
discrimination.781  The post was advertised in July 1999 and was short-listed with 
three other candidates for the post.782 Mrs M was appointed to the post despite the 
grievant that achieved the highest or the top score with the interview and had been 
working in the department on similar issues.783  The department defended the 
appointment of the post on the grounds that it was not bound or obligated in terms of 
any rule to appoint a candidate with the highest score.784  In this case the point 
difference was marginal.785  
 
Mrs M had a fair knowledge the policies and directives with regard to the directorate 
which was responsible for implementing the department‟s policies and also to 
promote representivity within the department.  She also had a vast knowledge 
pertaining to the relevant issues.786  The representivity of the Department would be 
improved by the appointment of an Indian female, Mrs M.787 
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Three grounds were provided by the arbitrator in favour of the department.788  Firstly, 
the arbitrator ruled that the union‟s objection to the selection committee amounted to 
an allegation of gender discrimination because it constituted of three women and only 
one man, resulting in the council to lack jurisdiction to consider.789 Secondly, the 
arbitrator deliberated on the union‟s argument that when utilizing affirmative action 
measures, the department was not permitted to differentiate between two candidates 
who both fell within designated groups as defined in the Employment Equity Act 
however, this was later rejected.790  The department responded that a directorate 
working with employment equity should put into action the policy in its own ranks and 
that it deserved consideration.791  Lastly, it was held that a directorate responsible for 
implementing employment equity which in itself was unrepresentative would find it 
extremely difficult to do so.792 Furthermore, it might be argued that the selection of 
people who would deliver the directorate representative was an operational 
requirement.793 
 
The arbitrator rejected the union's argument that the directorate was not entitled to 
use measures of the EEA before it had completed its own employment equity plan.794 
This argument, was mainly based on the Labour Court decision in Eskom v Hiemstra 
NO,795 which involved the allegation that the complainant or grievant had been 
discriminated against, resulting in it falling outside the council‟s jurisdiction.796  The 
arbitrator was satisfied that, the department acted in terms of its own policies as was 
required in the Eskom decision. The decision to appoint Mrs M was not arbitrary or 
inappropriate under the prevailing circumstances.797 The arbitrator found that the 
union had failed to prove that the complainant was a victim of an unfair labour 
practice having regard to other arguments and case law.798 
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In the fifth case of Germishuys v Upington Municipality,799 in June 1998 the position 
of Assistant Town Treasurer at the Upington Municipality became vacant and the 
applicant, a white male, applied for the vacant position as Town Treasurer.  He was 
unsuccessful and a black male was appointed to the post.800  The applicant alleged 
that he was the victim of racial discrimination, and claimed compensation equivalent 
to the amount he would have received had he been appointed to the position.801 
 
The court noted that the respondent was bound by an agreement concluded in the 
National Labour Relations Forum for Local Government.802  The objectives of the 
agreement included the transformation of local government authorities, the promotion 
of equal opportunities, and the advancement of affirmative action programmes.803  
The position was advertised, and attracted a number of applicants.  None of these 
applicants were considered suitable for this position.804  It was then re-advertised and 
four candidates were short-listed.805  The applicant was also included in the 
shortlisted applicants that consisted of two whites and two black applicants.806  Upon 
meeting with the other black candidates the applicant concluded that neither had the 
requisite experience required for this position.807  The candidates wrote a test, and 
were interviewed individually by a selection committee made up of councillors, senior 
officials and trade union representatives.808  Upon being informed that his application 
was unsuccessful, he took legal advice and requested to be furnished with the 
reasons for his non-appointment.809 
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The court held that the applicant bore the onus of proving that the respondents had 
unfairly discriminated against him on the basis of race.810  The applicant relied on the 
fact that he was the “best” candidate for the position and on his own subjective 
interpretation of what constituted “relevant experience”.811  The applicant suggested 
that the black members of the selection committee were “backward” and this 
demonstrated not only the applicant‟s arrogance and racial prejudice, but also 
implied that the individuals concerned were unable to reach a reasoned conclusion 
on the merits when deliberating as members of the selection panel.812  The root of 
the whole dispute was the applicant‟s inability to accept that he was not the most 
suitable candidate for the job.813 
 
He had attempted to advance a case of alleged racial discrimination on the basis of 
speculation, unjustified inferences and a refusal to accept that he was not suitable.814  
An employer who selects one of several applicants necessarily “discriminates” 
against the unsuccessful candidates.815  However, such “discrimination” should more 
properly be termed “differentiation”.816  Even if the applicant had been discriminated 
against, he had not proved that he was discriminated against on arbitrary grounds.817 
 
Lastly, in Walters v Transitional Local Council of Port Elizabeth818 the applicant was a 
white female and employed by the first respondent.819  The applicant was further one 
of several applicants who applied for the vacant post of principal personnel officer.820  
After the applicant applied for the post, she and several others were short-listed.821  
After the interviews, the second applicant a black male was appointed by the 
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selection panel.822  The applicant claimed that the first respondent‟s failure to appoint 
her constituted an “unjustified act of favouritism” towards the second respondent and 
that the first respondent had discriminated against her on the basis of her race and / 
or political opinion.823  The applicant contended further that the first respondent was 
not entitled to rely on the defence of affirmative action, as it had no affirmative action 
policy in place at the time of the second respondent‟s appointment.824   
 
The court noted that the applicant relied on two causes of action namely an alleged 
infringement of her constitutional rights to equality and an alleged unfair labour 
practice as contemplated under the Labour Relations Act.825   
 
The first cause of action relied directly on the Constitution and the second was 
statutory, but enshrined in legislation that seeks to give expression to the 
fundamental rights ensconced in the Constitution.826  The Act seeks to give effect not 
only to labour rights enshrined in the Constitution, but also to various other civil 
rights.827 
 
The court noted further that, insofar as the applicant sought to enforce civil rights, the 
court had concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court over alleged violations of any 
fundamental right arising from employment and labour relations, from any dispute 
over the constitutionality of any law administered by the Minister of Labour.828   
 
The applicant had alleged an infringement of her right to equality.829  She contended 
further that the action was against a local authority, which forms part of the State.830  
The court accordingly had jurisdiction to entertain the first cause of action.831  The 
next question was whether the legislature intended that a person can institute a civil 
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rights claim by directly relying on the Constitution, even though the Act provides 
similar and adequate relief.832  There was no reason why a public sector employee 
who is entitled to bring a cause of action under a statue such as the Act, should 
thereby be confined to that legislation.833  It may well be that the legislation is too 
restrictive, or that the remedies provided are inadequate.834  However, the court held 
that in the applicant‟s case the Act gave her sufficient scope to pursue her cause of 
action, and afforded her sufficient relief.835  
 
With regard to the applicant‟s unfair labour practice claim, the court noted that she 
had claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of “favouritism”, political 
opinion and race.836  The court assumed that the allegation of “favouritism” was 
linked to the allegation of discrimination on the basis of political opinion.837  Apart 
from a reference in the discussions prior to the appointment of the second 
respondent to his affiliations to a certain organisation, and to an alleged statement by 
one of the committee members that the second respondent‟s appointment was 
“political”, there was no evidence to prove that the applicant was discriminated 
against on the basis of her political opinion.838  
 
However with regard to the applicant‟s allegation that she was discriminated against 
on the basis of her race, the court noted that, in one breath, the applicant denied that 
the respondent could rely on affirmative action to appoint the second respondent, 
and in the next breath, claimed that the respondent had acted unfairly by not applying 
affirmative action principles to her.839  Furthermore, the applicant had relied on 
affirmative action for the contention that she should have been appointed on the 
basis of gender.840  However, from the respondent‟s evidence it was apparent that 
the applicant had fared best in responding to questions from the selection panel, and 
that the second respondent had displayed a lack of understanding of the basic 
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concepts of job evaluation, which was a central function of the post in question.841  
On the first respondent‟s own evidence it was apparent that the predominant reason 
for not appointing the applicant was her race.842  The respondent could not justify 
such a decision in terms of its own affirmative action policy.843  The first respondent‟s 
failure to appoint the applicant to the position therefore amounted to an unfair labour 
practice and therefore unfair discrimination.844 
 
Turning to relief, the court noted that the respondent had appointed the second 
respondent on a permanent basis even though it was aware that litigation was 
pending.845  This action was irrelevant to the relief claimed by the applicant, which 
was an order appointing her to the position.846  However, her “delictual” claim for 
infringement of her constitutional right to equality was rejected.847 
 
Prior to the recent case of Coetzer v Minister of Safety and Security848 there was no 
precedent for how courts should handle situations in which an employer turns down 
qualified and suitable personnel from non-designated groups when there was no 
competition at all from members of designated groups.849  In the present case, the 
applicants were white male inspectors in the explosives unit more particularly, the 
bomb squad of the South African Police Service (hereinafter referred to as 
“SAPS”).850  These applicants were highly trained in this specialised unit.851  In terms 
of the general SAPS Employment Equity Plan (hereinafter referred to as “EEP”) they 
belonged to the non-designated group, for whom there were limited promotional 
posts in the explosives unit.852  Once all the non-designated posts were filled, the 
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applicants applied for posts reserved for the designated group.853  Notwithstanding 
the fact that no applications for these promotional posts were received from members 
of the designated group, the applicants were refused promotion.854  The applicants 
called upon the Labour Court to determine whether the SAPS had unfairly 
discriminated against them on a racial basis by not promoting them to posts retained 
for the designated group.855  The SAPS contended that its discrimination was not 
unfair as it was in accordance with its affirmative action plan contained in the EEP.856  
The forensic laboratory unit under which the bomb squad fell did not have its own 
EEP as was required in terms of general SAPS EEP.857  The court held that the 
SAPS justification failed in two respects858 in that there was no specific action plan 
for the explosives unit and the National Commissioner‟s refusal to promote 
representivity.859  This decision overlooked a consideration of the constitutional 
imperative that the service maintains its efficiency.860  The SAPS was found to have 
unfairly discriminated against the applicants and was ordered to promote the 
applicants to the ranks of captains.861 
 
Taking into account the cases mentioned above, it is clear that it provides some form 
of defence and render discrimination in terms of affirmative action, lawful and 
permissible. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
DISMISSAL TO MAKE ROOM FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
APPOINTMENTS 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In the previous chapter when affirmative action is permissible (lawful) and regarded 
as a defence is discussed.  In this chapter dismissal to make room for affirmative 
action appointments will be discussed. 
 
7.2 DISMISSAL TO MAKE ROOM FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
APPOINTMENTS 
 
It is not unusual for an employer and an employee to agree that an employee will 
take early retirement to make way for an affirmative action appointment in the more 
senior ranks.  The employee will act as a mentor to the newly appointed employee 
for a period of time in which he / she will then teach the newly appointed the ropes.    
In turn they will be compensated for the services rendered for the early termination of 
his / her employment contract. In most cases the employee is selected for dismissal 
because he is white and /or male.862 
 
This dismissal is prohibited by section 6(I) of the EEA.  However, it can also be 
argued that such a dismissal constitutes an affirmative action measure as defined in 
section 6(I) of the EEA.  It can further be argued that such a dismissal constitutes an 
affirmative action measure as defined in section 6(2). The formulation is wide and it 
includes measures to ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified 
persons in all job categories and levels.  Section 15(4) of the EEA states that nothing 
in section 15 requires a designated employer to take any decision concerning an 
employment policy or practice that would establish an absolute barrier to the 
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prospective or continued employment or advancement of people who are not from 
the designated groups. 
 
This entails that an employer is not compelled when designing and implementing 
affirmative action measures never to appoint, continue to employ or to promote 
people from outside the designated groups.  
 
There is no need to dismiss an employee and it can be argued that such a dismissal 
contravenes section 6 and the employee‟s constitutional right to fair labour practices 
falling outside the ambit of an affirmative action measure.   
 
The Employment Equity Act did not repeal section 187(11)(f) of the LRA. This section 
provides that it is automatically unfair to dismiss an employee if the reason for the 
dismissal is unfair discrimination against the employee on any arbitrary ground 
including but not limited to race, sex, gender, etc.  In Van Zyl v Department of 
Labour863 the Commissioner argued that a dismissal in these circumstances could 
not be based on the operational requirements of the employer in that there was no 
need to reduce personnel.  This decision has been criticized as giving a too narrow 
conception of operational requirements.   
 
In McInnes v Technikon Natal864 the applicant was employed by the respondent on a 
“locum” basis as a lecturer in 1996.  Her one-year contract was renewed three times 
before the post was eventually advertised on a permanent basis.  The applicant 
applied for the position, was short-listed with two other candidates and the selection 
committee recommended that the applicant should be appointed. 
 
The respondent‟s Vice-Chancellor recommended a black male candidate, who was 
appointed at a salary much higher than that which had been advertised and, indeed, 
higher than that of the head of department. The applicant‟s contract was not 
renewed.  The applicant‟s head of department proposed that an additional post be 
created for the applicant which was not acted upon.  The applicant claimed that she 
had been unfairly dismissed, alternatively, unfairly discriminated against on the basis 
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of race and/or sex.  At the time of the application, the affirmative action candidate 
had already left the services of the respondent.  The respondent challenged the 
court‟s jurisdiction, and denied that the applicant had been dismissed.   
 
With regard to the jurisdictional issue, the court held that if an applicant alleges that a 
dismissal is automatically unfair then the court assumes jurisdiction, provided only 
that the allegation was made seriously and in good faith.  The court did not assume 
jurisdiction only when the allegation was proved. In any event, it was common cause 
that the applicant had not been appointed to the position because of her race.   
 
Turning to the question of whether the applicant had indeed been dismissed, the 
court noted that the answer entailed a two-stage inquiry.  Firstly, to determine 
whether the applicant had an expectation that she would be appointed and secondly, 
to determine whether the expectation of appointment upon which the applicant relied 
was reasonable in the circumstances.  In the first enquiry, the applicant was required 
to prove that she subjectively believed that her contract would be renewed on the 
same or similar terms.   
 
The applicant had pleaded in this regard that she had expected her contract to be 
renewed on a permanent basis, alternatively, that it would be renewed for a further 
period of one year.  It was noted by the court that it was not possible to hold two 
subjective expectations at the same time.  However, although the applicant was 
somewhat vague about the details of what she expected, the crux of her evidence 
was that she had expected to continue doing the same work after the date on which 
her employment was terminated, albeit on a permanent basis. 
 
The court rejected the respondent‟s contention that an expectation of the renewal of 
a fixed-term contract of employment on a permanent basis did not amount to a 
reasonable expectation of renewal for purposes of the Act, and held that an earlier 
decision by the court which held this to be the case was plainly wrong.865  The main 
focus is on the nature of the expectation and on whether in the circumstances the 
expectation was reasonable. 
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It is quite conceivable that an employee on a fixed-term contract can expect to be 
appointed permanently.  The court held that, in the circumstances, the applicant‟s 
expectation of renewal was indeed reasonable, notwithstanding the fact that she had 
applied for the position knowing that another candidate might be appointed.  The 
applicant had accordingly been dismissed unfairly because affirmative action cannot 
constitute a fair basis for dismissing, as opposed to appointing, an employee.   
 
As to the applicant‟s alternative claim of unfair discrimination, the court noted that the 
successful candidate did not meet the requirements set out in the advertisement 
because he lacked extensive experience.  The selection committee had decided that 
the applicant was the best candidate.  However, the Vice-Chancellor had taken the 
view that in terms of the respondent‟s affirmative action policy, if a black candidate 
was short-listed, he or she should be preferred to white candidates.   
 
The committee had then rubber-stamped the Vice-Chancellor‟s decision, in spite of 
their belief that the applicant was the best candidate.  Although the favoured 
candidate had been told that the advertised salary was not negotiable, the 
respondent had negotiated a salary with him that was far above that advertised.   
 
It was clear that these actions were countenanced by the respondent‟s affirmative 
action policy, which did not require a selection committee to regard race as the sole 
criterion when a choice had to be made between two persons who were appointable.  
The policy did not sanction blatant race discrimination in favour of Africans against 
other race groups.   
 
The respondent‟s policy envisaged that during selection a balanced view would be 
taken of all relevant criteria, including the respective merits of the candidates.  
Neither the policy nor the law sanctioned offered members of particular group higher 
salaries than those advertised.  The appointment of the successful candidate was 
therefore not in accordance with the respondent‟s affirmative action policy.  The 
respondent had failed to justify discriminating against the applicant.  The court noted 
that had it not found in favour of the applicant in respect of her main cause of action. 
72 
It would accordingly have found for her in respect of the alternative cause of action.  
The applicant was reinstated without loss of benefits.   
 
7.2 FAILURE TO PROMOTE A PERSON FROM A DESIGNATED GROUP 
 
A person who applies for employment falling within a designated group but is refused 
may be able to argue that this refusal by the employer constitutes unfair 
discrimination. Discrimination against such an employee is no different from 
discrimination on any other prohibited ground such as sexual orientation, pregnancy 
or marital status. Should the Applicant fall within one of the designated groups that 
Applicant ought to be given the right or preferential claim to such a job? 
 
Where it can be established by the employer that the white male appointed to the job 
was a better candidate than the black, female of disabled applicants who also applied 
for the job there will be no unfair discrimination on these grounds.  It will not assist 
the applicants from the designated groups to argue that they can do the job and 
should be appointed because the employer‟s workforce does not reflect an equitable 
representation of employees from the designated groups.  The incentive lies in the 
fact that the employer will have to comply with the long and medium term 
commitments imposed by its employment equity plan drawn up in terms of Chapter 3. 
 
In the case of Eskom v Hiemstra NO866 there was an application for review of an 
award by an IMSSA arbitrator, Advocate J Hiemstra.867  The arbitrator heard that 
Eskom had invited applications from its employees for the post of vending controller.  
Eskom was an affirmative action employer and thirteen employees applied, including 
Ms Van Coller.  She scored 80 points and her closest rival, a Ms Samuels scored 
64.868  Ms Van Coller was recommended for the position.  
 
During the selection process, Ms Samuel‟s union lodged a grievance against the 
composition of the list of candidates selected for interview on the basis that whites 
were included.  This grievance was investigated by a (black) manager who found that 
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the selection process had been fairly conducted and had not prejudiced anybody.  
The union went over the manager‟s head to a more senior (white) manager who, as 
head of the department concerned, decided to appoint Ms Samuels.  The head of 
department told the arbitrator that Ms Samuel‟s union had complained that his 
department had not made satisfactory progress with affirmative action.  Since all the 
positions in the relevant grade were, in fact, held by whites, the department head was 
forced to agree.  The manager said that he had decided to appoint Ms Samuels 
solely because the company had adopted an affirmative action “stance” (as opposed 
to a formal policy). Eskom had committed itself, in writing, only to introducing “a 
strategy, policy and practices aiming to alter the racial and gender profile of Eskom to 
be representative of the nation as a whole”.  In terms of this “stance”, Eskom would 
ultimately reach a stage at which race, gender and creed would no longer affect 
employment opportunities, and the sole criteria for appointment or promotion would 
be performance and ability.  To this end, Eskom had adopted a “framework for 
action” in terms of which the company‟s organisational groups were enjoined to 
“develop and implement their own programmes in line with Eskom‟s objectives and 
desired state”.  The document noted that each group had a unique working 
environment “that cannot be impacted [sic] by a blanket programme”.  At the time of 
the appointment of Ms Samuels, this was as far as Eskom had taken its affirmative 
action programme. However, the manager responsible for the appointment to the 
position of vending controller saw it as his duty to appoint a black person if there was 
a sufficiently qualified black candidate. 
 
The arbitrator was required to decide whether the failure to appoint Ms Van Coller 
amounted to an unfair labour practice within the meaning of the term in paragraph (a) 
or (b) of Item (2)(1) of Schedule 7 to the Labour Relations Act. Eskom relied on item 
2(2)(b) of the Schedule.  This was all Eskom could rely on, as it had already 
conceded that Ms Van Coller had been denied the recommended appointment, for 
which she was objectively the best candidate, solely because she was white and Ms 
Samuels was “coloured”.  Item 2(2)(b) provides that, in spite of the general 
prohibition against unfair discrimination contained in Item 2(1)(a), an employer may 
adopt and implement employment policies and practices that are “designed to 
achieve the adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or 
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categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their 
full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”. 
 
The arbitrator turned for guidance to the first case in which a blow was struck for the 
rights of white workers, Public Servants’ Association of South Africa v Minister of 
Justice.869  From the case, and from the provisions of the EEA, Mr Hiemstra drew the 
following principles which, in his view, governed cases in which employers raise the 
defence of affirmative action against an allegation of race discrimination: that it is not 
enough for an employer to rely upon a “broad intention” (“breë bedoeling”) to 
advance or protect persons or groups or categories of persons, the employer must 
rely on standards that have been developed for that purpose; those standards must 
not exceed the adequate protection and advancement of the designated groups or 
categories of persons; when affirmative action is applied, the rights of other members 
of the community must not be “undermined”; and efficiency must not be 
compromised.  
 
After applying these principles to the facts at hand, Mr Hiemstra reached the 
following conclusion: 
 
“Although it is clearly set out in the proposal, Eskom has not developed standards and 
procedures, and affirmative action is applied haphazardly without specific guidelines.  
In the absence of such standards, item 2(2)(b) is not available as a defence.  The 
manner in which Mr Du Plessis applies affirmative action, namely only to require that 
black candidates possess the minimum qualification, may undermine efficiency and 
promote mediocrity. There is no doubt that Miss Van Coller was treated unfairly.  The 
only question is whether the unfairness was justifiable under the circumstance.  
Eskom‟s actions plainly amount to race discrimination and it can only be justified in 
terms of item 2(2)(b). The internal requirement of the sub-item and the applicable 
constitutional prescriptions must be complied with.  Eskom has not complied with 
them”.  
 
Eskom requested the Labour Court to set aside this finding on the ground that the 
arbitrator had misdirected himself. What he should have done, argued Eskom, was 
first consider whether the appointment of “Ms Samuels per se was unfair” and only in 
the event of a finding that it was unfair, then consider the defence that the act of 
discrimination was to promote affirmative action as contemplated by Item 2(2)(b).  
Eskom relied on this ground alone.  What Eskom appears to have meant is that, 
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when an appointment is attacked by a disappointed candidate, the first consideration 
is whether the employer acted unfairly towards the unsuccessful applicant by 
appointing the successful candidate.  To answer this question, the appointment of the 
successful candidate must be examined to see whether it was justifiable in itself.  
Only if the successful candidate‟s appointment is not justifiable can the conclusion be 
reached that the disappointed candidate was treated unfairly.  If, then, the employer 
raises affirmative action as a defence, the next consideration is whether that 
unfairness was justifiable in terms of 2(2)(b). In other words, whether the 
discrimination was “fair” must be established in terms of the objective of affirmative 
action that it was meant to serve.  Eskom‟s complaint was that the arbitrator had 
never asked himself the crucial question: did the appointment of Ms Samuels involve 
race discrimination?  Only once that question had been answered, so Eskom argued, 
was the arbitrator entitled to consider, whether the appointment was unfair. 
 
The court (per Landman J) refused to allow itself to be persuaded by this reasoning. 
The judge observed:870 
 
“This issue can be answered in two ways with the same result… The arbitrator may 
well have asked the crucial question: was the discrimination, for it is common cause 
that there was discrimination in the sense of differentiation, between a black employee 
and a white employee prima facie unfair? If the arbitrator was of the opinion that it was, 
he would pass on to the next step and ask whether it was justified in terms of item 
2(2)(b) …” 
 
If the ubiquitous bystander had asked the arbitrator as he was writing his award: 
„Was the discrimination on the grounds of race unfair?‟  The arbitrator may well have 
responded: “Of course it is‟ and have explained that the real issue in the matter was 
whether the discrimination was justified.  I am unable to hold that the arbitrator did 
not ask himself the question.  In my opinion he identified the issue and cut to the 
chase”.871 
 
The “chase”, of course, was whether Ms Van Coller was treated unfairly.  By Eskom‟s 
own admission, had other things been equal, she deserved the job. However, 
according to Eskom, other things were not equal and had to be rendered equal by 
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giving preference to its black employees.  The arbitrator had to decide whether the 
fact that the person appointed was from a “disadvantaged” group neutralised the fact 
that Ms Van Coller was overlooked simply because she was white.  In the arbitrator‟s 
view, the mere fact that Ms Samuels was black was not, in itself, enough to render 
Eskom‟s treatment of Ms Van Coller fair.  Eskom had to show, in addition, that the 
appointment of Ms Samuels formed part of a rational plan that was aimed at 
achieving the objectives that the legislature had prescribed as minimum requirements 
for rendering defensible to favour a person solely on the basis of race.  These 
requirements are contained in Item 2(2)(b).872  According to that provision, an 
applicant for employment or promotion can be favoured on the basis of race only if 
his or her appointment is designed to achieve the adequate protection or 
advancement of persons or groups of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination, for the purpose of enabling the favoured person to enjoy his or her full 
and equal rights and freedoms.  Landman J interpreted the award in the same way: 
 
“A reading of the award shows that the arbitrator paid considerable attention to 
Eskom‟s affirmative action stance which was tendered at the arbitration proceedings. 
The arbitrator examined this  document and concluded that it was not an affirmative 
action policy as contemplated by item 2(2)(b).  According to the arbitrator it expressly 
required further detailed and specific amplification and individualised plans for each 
operating division. This had not been done. It was left to the managers to decide what 
they believed was good policy.  He found that this was not what item 2(2)(b) 
contemplated.” 
 
In Abbott v Bargaining Council for the Motor Industry (Western Cape),873 Mr Abbott, 
who described himself as a “coloured man”, claimed that he was overlooked for 
employment as a designated agent of the respondent in favour of a “white” man and 
that this amounted to unfair discrimination.874  He said that, apart from his race, he 
was also overlooked because he was a union member.875  Mr Abbott was 42 years 
old and came from a poor family.  He had left school when he was in standard 8 to 
support his family, was currently a panel-beater and had obtained a university 
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qualification in labour relations.  Thus, said Mr Abbott, he possessed all the qualities 
of a disadvantaged person.876 
 
The court accepted that to succeed with a claim under item 2(1)(a) a  person need to 
be able to prove more than that he is disadvantaged . This becomes clear from the 
way in which the court approached the matter.  Judge Landman began by observing 
that, although a literal reading Item 2(1)(a) appeared to suggest that a person might 
succeed in such a claim even if he could not show that the discrimination had no 
effect on him, this could not be the case.877  By this, the court presumably meant than 
an applicant could be granted relief under the residual unfair labour practice if there 
was some adverse consequence to relief.  Nothing that the Act permits discrimination 
when it is necessary because of the “inherent requirements of the job” and in order to 
implement affirmative action, the judge raised the question of whether, as he put it, 
“affirmative action is then merely a shield for an enlightened employer or … a sword 
for a disadvantaged person”.878  More technically, the question can be put thus: does 
affirmative action yield rights for the employer against claims of unfair 
discrimination?879 
 
The judge and Mr Abbott‟s counsel agreed that affirmative action is only a defence.  
However, the latter contended that the affirmative action principles ought to be taken 
into account when assessing whether an employer had acted fairly.  With this, the 
judge did not agree.880  “Juridically”, he said, “this policy (ie, affirmative action) does 
not give a right to an applicant for employment, at least one who has no existing 
relationship with the employer.  The policy stands on the same footing as the terms 
of the advertisement inviting applications for the job.  The policy is, I think, a term of 
the invitation to treat and good labour relation binds the employer to follow it”.881 
 
On this view, then, affirmative action binds an employer only to the extent that it has 
been formally implemented as a policy.  A claim in an advertisement that the 
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employer is an “affirmative action employer”, or some similar expression, confers no 
grounds on which outside applicants can rely if the employer subsequently makes an 
appointment that is arguably inconsistent with that policy.  Such a claim does not 
alter the status of the advertisement. It remains simply an invitation to enter into a 
contract.  Before that happens, an employer cannot be held to its puffery by those 
who might have been seduced by it.  What the court is really saying is that an 
applicant for employment who happens to have come from a disadvantage group 
cannot simply say: “I am black/female/disabled; ergo, I have been discriminated 
against.”  Nor can such a disappointed applicant claim that, simply because the 
employer had professed to adhere to affirmative action, it had acted unfairly (in the 
sense contemplated by the residual unfair labour practice definition) merely because 
in a particular case the employer did not apply affirmative action. 
 
The Labour Court adopted a similar approach in TGWU v Bayete Security 
Holdings.882  This involved an application in terms of item 2(1)(a) if Schedule 7 of 
Labour Relations Act.883  The individual applicant in that matter alleged that he was 
being unfairly discriminated against because he was paid less than a colleague who 
had been introduced as an experienced person who would teach the other workers 
(including the applicant) “to perform”.884 The applicant claimed that the new 
appointee had no experience in the industry.885  The court held that the applicant was 
obliged to prove in the first instance that the discrimination was not unfair.886  The 
court found, however, that payment of different wages to employees did not in itself 
amount to discrimination, unless it was based on some arbitrary ground.887  The 
applicant admitted that he had no idea what work the more highly paid employee 
performed, what his educational qualification were, for whom he had previously 
worked and for how long.888 That the higher paid employee was white and the 
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applicant was black was not enough to assume that the differentiation was based on 
race alone.889 
 
It is interesting to note that, in this respect, the Labour Court‟s approach is much the 
same as that adopted by the High Court under the common law.  Swanepoel v 
Western Region District Council890 provides an example of the latter court‟s attitude 
to applicants for employment who seek to justify claims that they have been 
discriminated against solely on the inference that arises from the facts that the other 
party is arguably less qualified and of a formerly favoured race group.891  The one 
additional factor that Miss Swanepoel threw onto the scale was that the 
advertisement for the position in question had stated that possession of a particular 
academic qualification (which she had and the person appointed did not) was a 
prerequisite for appointment.892 
 
The court was unimpressed by the fact that the person who had been appointed had 
professional experience (he had been an artillery officer) that, on the face of it, 
seemed of questionable relevance to his new position (an environmental education 
officer).893  The court found that there was not a shred of evidence on the papers to 
substantiate Miss Swanepoel‟s claims that the person appointed had been preferred 
because of his past political connections or to promote affirmative action. And even if 
he had been, the judge concluded, there was no basis for complaint if one was not 
selected for a position unless the employer had acted mala fide.894  
 
In Stulweni v SA Police Service (Western Cape Province)895 the applicant, a Muslim, 
applied for one of three advertised posts of chaplain to the SAPS.  He was 
unsuccessful and all three chaplain appointed were of the Christian faith. In 
proceedings before the CCMA he claimed that he had been discriminated against on 
the ground of his religion, contrary to section 6 of the Employment Equity Act.  The 
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respondent denied that the decision not to appoint the applicant had been based on 
his religion and pointed out that other successful candidates achieved higher scores 
in their interviews.  The Commissioner found that the applicant had misinterpreted 
the provisions of the Employment Equity Act.  His claim was not given special 
consideration because of his religion. The applicant was not looking for non-
discrimination against him but for positive discrimination or preferential treatment on 
the grounds of being a Muslim.   Section 15 of the Employment Equity Act provides 
that affirmative action may be taken in respect of three designated groups which are 
defined as black people, woman and people with disabilities.  The respondent had 
therefore no grounds to apply positive discriminations or affirmative action to the 
applicant on the basis of his religion. 
 
The Commissioner did not accept the applicant‟s claim that he had been given the 
impression that he would be appointed to the post, finding his claim to be 
inconsistent with his assertion that the question asked of him made it clear that he 
would not be appointed because of his religious convictions.  It was found that the 
respondent had acted objectively and properly in assessing the candidates on the 
basis of their answers to the questions and in awarding a score to cash. There had 
been no unfair discrimination.   
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR 
 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION    
 
The Department of Labour plays a pivotal role in our society.  The Department of 
Labour has several responsibilities.  It is in terms of this regard that this aspect needs 
to be addressed.  In this chapter the role and the responsibilities of the Department of 
Labour and the recommendations of the Department of Labour when it comes to 
employment equity will be discussed below. 
 
8.2 THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOUR  
 
Amongst some of the Departments responsibilities are the administration, monitoring 
and enforcement of the Employment Equity Act.896  The Minister of Labour is advised 
by the Commission for Employment Equity on several issues which entail policy 
issues concerning the Employment Equity Act, to provide employers with information 
that may assist them in implementing the Employment Equity Act in terms of the 
code of good practice and the implementation of affirmative action measures.897  
However, the Minister may issue, change or replace the codes whenever he deems it 
appropriate.898  Furthermore, the Employment Equity Act provides that regulations 
may be issued by the Minister on advice of the Commission for Employment 
Equity.899  Both codes of good practice and regulations can and have been issued.  
Due to time and space constraints only the code of good practice will be discussed 
below.     
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There are two code of good practice that was issued.  The first code is the Code of 
Good Practice: Preparation, Implementation and Monitoring of Employment Equity 
Plans.900  This code contains practical guidelines regarding the procedure and 
substance for implementing affirmative action measures.901  The second code is the 
Code of Good Practice on the Integration on Employment Equity into Human 
Resource Policies and Practice.902  This code on the other hand gives guidance on 
how to attract, manage, develop and retain talent in the workforce through effective 
human resource management.903 
 
The issue of citizenship as a requirement to benefit from affirmative action measures 
are not addressed in either the two codes or in the regulations.904  However, some 
guidance has been given in this regard on the Department of Labour‟s website under 
“Frequently asked Questions”.905  
 
An question of particular importance in this regard was “Do Foreign nationals qualify 
as members of designated (disadvantaged) groups?”906  The answer to this question 
was as follows: 
 
“Although foreign nationals may be included in the various designated groups as 
reported by the employer, it would be unacceptable to use these employees as the 
basis for measuring and setting numerical goals”.907    
 
The preclusion from using foreign nationals for measuring and setting numerical 
goals is welcomed.908  The purpose of these goals is to firstly, increase the 
representation of people from designated groups in each occupational category and 
level in the workforce where under representation has been identified, and secondly, 
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to make the workforce reflective of the countries demographics.909  However, it is 
very ambiguous allowing employers to include non-citizens for reporting purposes.910  
It may be the position that it is interpreted to mean that it can be reported on in terms 
of the Employment Equity Act if foreign nationals have firstly already been appointed 
or secondly will be appointed in the future in the ordinary course of business but not 
on the basis of affirmative action.911 
 
A comprise is reached by the ambiguous response between the total exclusion of 
foreign nationals when reporting on the representivity of designated groups and 
actually appointing them on the basis of affirmative action in terms of employer‟s 
employment equity plan.912  However this situation is not ideal.913  The reason being 
that firstly, the guidelines may be abused by employers and secondly, the approach 
of allowing foreign nationals to be reported as part of designated groups, may lead to 
a misleading picture and figures in respect of South African people who have actually 
been appointed in terms of affirmative action measures.914  Thirdly, if employers were 
allowed to recruit black, female and/or disabled non-citizens and use such figures for 
affirmative action purposes it would defeat the purpose of both the Constitution and 
the Employment Equity Act.915 
 
It is clear from the discussion above that affirmative action measures are meant to 
benefit South African citizens as accurately interpreted in both the Constitution and 
the Employment Equity Act for purposes of both measuring and setting numerical 
goals and for reporting purposes.916  The above position was confirmed and repeated 
by the Minister of Labour.917  The Minister of Labour repeated the fact employer‟s 
employment equity numerical goals cannot include black people from “anywhere in 
the world”.918  The Minister made it clear that the foreign black employees were not 
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subject to the remedies provided in the Employment Equity Act.919  The Act was 
enacted to remedy disadvantage suffered as a result of apartheid discrimination.920  
However, the Minister did state that employers cannot merely exclude foreigners 
from employment on the ground of their lack of South African citizenship if they have 
a valid working permit and are legally entitled to be in the country and discriminate 
against them.921 
 
8.3 THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR 
 
The Department of Labour recommended that to effect the appointment of South 
African citizens under affirmative action, it must take a formal policy decision that 
South African citizens be appointed and promoted under affirmative action in the 
workplace.922  Affirmative action measures are meant for those South African citizens 
who suffered disadvantage under patriarchy and apartheid. In short, foreigners who 
have not shared in this history should not reap these benefits. Such a policy decision 
should make the abovementioned unambiguously clear.923  
 
The recommendations made by the Department of Labour to give effect to the 
abovementioned will be discussed below.  Firstly, it is recommended that the 
National Economic Development and Labour Council hold a debate preceding the 
decision between business, labour and the government similar to the debate that 
preceded the Employment Equity Bill.924  The Minister Labour is advised on policy 
matters by the Commission for Employment Equity and therefore the Commission‟s 
involvement is of importance.925  A departmental source which is accessible to 
employers must reflect such a policy decision.926  The question namely “Do foreign 
nations qualify as members of designated (disadvantaged) groups?” addressed 
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above must be re-stated and the previous ambiguous answer be amended to read as 
follows: 
 
“Foreign nationals may either be included in the various designated groups as reported 
by the employer, nor is it acceptable to use these employees as the basis for 
measuring and setting numerical goals”.
927
 
 
Secondly, it is recommended that the Regulations to the Employment Equity Act and 
the Code of Good Practice be amended correspondingly to ensure certainty.928 
 
Thirdly, it is recommended that a broader effort be made by government and 
business to ensure that South African citizens in fact acquire jobs in the South 
African labour market apart from ensuring affirmative action for citizens.929  The 
approach to follow in this regard will be the sensible approach.  This will be to firstly 
consider nationals for available jobs and only if no such persons with suitable 
qualifications can be found, can the employer go wider and recruit foreigners.930  The 
basis for this approach is also laid out in the Immigration Act.931   
 
The Immigration Act on the one hand provides that only if a foreigner falls within 
certain categories determined by the Minister of Home Affairs may work permits for 
“quota” work be issued.932  In order for a “general” work permit to be issued the 
prospective employer must satisfy the Department of Home Affairs that, despite a 
diligent search, it has been unable to employ a person in the country with 
qualifications equivalent to those of the applicant.933  Furthermore, in order for a 
“permanent residence” permit to be granted if it can be shown that the position and 
related job description were advertised in the prescribed form and that no “suitably 
qualified” citizen or resident has been found to fill the position.934  Moreover, such a 
foreigner must have extraordinary skills or qualifications.935   
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It is, however, realistic to expect that, due to skills shortages in South African, 
suitably qualified citizens may not currently be found for all available jobs.936  On the 
other hand, the Immigration Act provides that the South African economy should 
have access to the “needed” contributions of foreigners.937  Such contributions are, 
however, explicitly stated so as not to adversely impact on the rights and 
expectations of South African workers.938  This approach clearly involves a weighing 
up of competing interest and can only be efficiently enforced in favour of South 
African citizens if there is full co-operation between the Department of Labour and 
the Department of Home Affairs.939 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
When affirmative action was implemented, it resulted in white people being 
overlooked in favour of non-white people, their reaction was one of being victims, in 
that non-whites are being preferred above themselves.  What they do forget is that 
during the apartheid era, whites were preferred above non-whites, irrespective of 
their qualifications.  
    
Upon arrival of the new South Africa, the new government implemented an 
affirmative action policy in the form of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, trying 
to redress the imbalances created by the old government during apartheid.  The view 
is that for affirmative action to be successful, education and training should weigh as 
heavily as, or even more heavily than, the representativeness of a workforce.  By 
educating and training the workforce, the wage disparities will decrease due to the 
country and its population becoming more competitive in the International market, 
resulting in an increase of foreign investment in South Africa.  The danger that exists 
with forced implementation of affirmative action by why of the Employment Equity 
Act, is the problem of education and training not being equally addressed.  This could 
result in the well-off non-whites only being helped, instead of those at a disadvantage 
due to their lack in education and training caused by apartheid. 
 
A further problem with making compensation for past injustices is that one simply do 
not know and cannot know what would have been without the injustices.  Affirmative 
action theory states that the purpose of affirmative action is to put those who suffered 
injustices in the same condition as they would have been in without the injustices. 
 
An interesting question is:  will an Afrikaner who is part black, count to some degree 
towards affirmative action more than a white who has no black blood?  If the answer 
to the last question is affirmative, one could end up with a situation where someone 
who strongly supported apartheid is being recompensed for the injustices of 
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apartheid, while someone who opposed apartheid is being punished for those same 
injustices.  At the end one has to ask who will be judge of the racial make-up of the 
various groups in the non-racial South Africa? 
 
The promotion of equality and prevention of unfair discrimination Act 4 of 2000 and 
the employment equity Act 55 of 1998 were enacted to combat obstacles in the 
implementation of racial equity in employment in South Africa.  However, there are 
internal challenges within the labour sector, such as appointment, and there are 
problems outside.  The labour market faces challenges such as the disparities left by 
apartheid.  The right to non-discrimination and affirmative action are two tools offered 
by the legislative framework to overcome the social problems created by apartheid. 
 
Research indicates some employment cases that have already been heard by the 
South African Law Commission.  The number of reported cases are still very small.  It 
indicates as I have already indicated in chapter 6 and 7 above  that there are no clear 
guidelines on how affirmative action is to be constructed and implemented.  
Affirmative action was proposed to be remedial intervention, but of late the goal has 
changed to address racial representation.  Its target is limited to a restricted group of 
beneficiaries.  This does not make it inappropriate as a tool to achieve more racial 
equality, yet it does restrain its effectiveness. 
 
Over the past number of years, Courts have regularly been called upon to evaluate 
the legality of affirmative action programmes in the workplace.  Initially, the cases 
focused on the existence and design of affirmative action plans, which in turn led to 
the principle of rationality being firmly embedded as the overriding principle such 
plans have to pass muster.  This principle has been adopted by the Employment 
Equity Act through its obligation on designated employers to design and implement 
affirmative action plans, while at the same time maintaining a measure of reality 
through the yardstick laid down in section 42 of the Employment Equity Act for 
determination of the question whether employers are meeting this obligation.  
Subsequent to the adoption of the Employment Equity Act, the focus has shifted to 
application in practice of affirmative action plans.  One particularly vexing issue which 
has come to fore, relates to the right of members of designated groups within the 
broader scheme of affirmative action.  More fundamentally, the issue that remains to 
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be considered and addressed fully, relates to the link between unfair discrimination, 
affirmative action and substantive equality. 
 
It is clear from the discussion above that South Africa has tried to address the issues 
in South Africa with regard to affirmative action both in terms of the Employment 
Equity Act and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
4 of 2000.  However, it is clear that there are still several loopholes that exist in these 
legislation and clearly room for improvement.  Furthermore, case law has assisted 
the courts in areas where the legislation do not provide for. 
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